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Abstract
The Delaware courts responded to the recent wave of corporate
scandals, exemplified by Enron and WorldCom, by changing their
approach to shareholder derivative litigation. This Article analyzes the
Delaware courts’ response to these scandals and concludes that the courts
have created doctrinal confusion and introduced unpredictability into
derivative litigation. This Article also analyzes the future negative
consequences for shareholders, corporations, directors, investors, and other
litigants. Finally, this Article proposes improvements for derivative
litigation that may alleviate the confusion and unpredictability created by
the Delaware courts’ response to the recent scandals. 
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1. See E. Norman Veasey, State–Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the
Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 441–42 (2003) (stating that “the
Enron debacle erupted” in the fall of 2001, “[s]oon thereafter Worldcom crashed,” and “[o]ther
corporate disasters were to follow in quick succession”).
2. See id. (noting that the Enron and WorldCom scandals revealed that “(1) officers ran
amok, wallowing in greed-driven schemes and other abuses; and (2) directors allowed it to happen,
tolerating officers who were managing to the market while they contented the directors with ever-
rising stock prices”).
3. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
4. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. IV 2004). 
5. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m).
6. For a summary and explanation of the new SEC regulations, see David Martin,
Compliance Obligations Under Sarbanes–Oxley Act and Related SEC Regulations, BANKING &
FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., June 2005, at 6. For a summary of the rules that apply to attorneys, see
Charles E. McCallum, The SEC Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Under the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act, DEL. LAW., Spring 2003, at 10.
7. DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE
AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM 182 (2005).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate law has radically changed in response to the wave of
corporate scandals that began in 2001.  The highly publicized scandals at1
Enron, WorldCom, and other corporations revealed officers who were out
of control and directors who were asleep at the wheel.  Congress2
responded by enacting the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002,  which imposes3
new requirements on the officers and directors of publicly traded
corporations,  and forces listing companies—such as the New York Stock4
Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ—to impose more restrictive
requirements on public companies.  The Securities and Exchange5
Commission (SEC) also adopted numerous new regulations in response to
the scandals.  Undoubtedly, Sarbanes–Oxley “shook up America’s6
boardrooms and forced corporate executives to rethink the way they had
been doing things.”  Statutory and regulatory requirements, however, do7
not represent the only changes facing corporations. The courts are
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8. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 416–17 (2005). The
Sarbanes–Oxley Act did not displace the common-law fiduciary duties or the business judgment
rule, particularly because “it fails to impose any direct legal penalties on directors who breach” the
Act. See id. at 395, 405–07. 
9. See William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States, Remarks Given on the
Occasion of the Bicentennial Celebration of the Delaware Court of Chancery: Prominence of the
Delaware Court of Chancery in the State–Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice (Sept. 18,
1992), in 48 BUS. LAW. 351, 354 (1992) (describing Delaware’s preeminence in corporate law);
see also Veasey, supra note 1, at 443 (“Delaware law is the default repository for the rich and
comprehensive common law of fiduciary duty of directors . . . .”).
10. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the
Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L.REV. 261,
279 (1986); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 55, 55–56 (1991).
11. See generally JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (2006) (discussing the corporate scandals and their impact on corporate governance);
TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD (2006)
(same); SKEEL, supra note 7 (same).
12. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 18–47 (2002); Roberta Romano, The
Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005);
see also Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing
Corporate Crime, 55 FLA.L.REV.937, 952–56 (2003) (explaining that the severe criminal penalties
in Sarbanes–Oxley are unlikely to deter future conduct); cf. Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both
Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes–Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of
Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH U. L.Q. 329, 349–55 (2003) (noting the shortcomings
of the Act but acknowledging that “Sarbanes–Oxley was a measured and appropriate response to
the abject failures in U.S. corporate governance”).
13. See, e.g., Irwin H. Steinhorn & William M. Lewis, Corporate Compliance Under the
Regulations Implementing Sarbanes–Oxley, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 30 (2006); Miriam
Miquelon Weismann, Corporate Transparency or Congressional Window-Dressing? The Case
Against Sarbanes–Oxley as a Means to Avoid Another Corporate Debacle: The Failed Attempt to
changing as well.  The Delaware courts, which lead the development of8
corporate common law,  also responded to the recent corporate scandals,9
but unfortunately, this judicial response injected doctrinal confusion and
unpredictability into shareholder derivative litigation.
Corporate scholars have long debated the merit of shareholder
derivative litigation as a method of influencing corporate governance.10
Yet, despite this debate, shareholder derivative litigation continues to serve
as a primary method by which shareholders hold directors accountable for
their actions. Nothing in Sarbanes–Oxley altered shareholders’ ability to
file derivative litigation, and scholars have not proposed modifying such
litigation in response to the recent scandals.
Corporate scholars have analyzed the causes of the recent scandals
and the scandals’ impact on corporate governance.  They have critiqued11
Sarbanes–Oxley  and the SEC’s new regulations that implement12
Sarbanes–Oxley.  Corporate scholars have even evaluated13
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Revive Meaningful Regulatory Oversight, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 98 (2004).
14. See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 8, at 395–96, 405–07 (examining the failure of
Sarbanes–Oxley to impose any direct legal penalties on directors); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark
A. Sides, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149,
1209–19 (2004) (examining the interplay between Sarbanes–Oxley and fiduciary duties under state
law).
15. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.) (Disney VI), 906 A.2d 27 (Del.
2006). For simplicity’s sake, this Article uses “Disney” to refer generally to the entire derivative
litigation.
16. Id. at 35.
17. Id. at 35 n.1; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 731 A.2d 342, 380 (Del.
Ch. 1998), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner (Disney II), 746 A.2d 244 (Del.
2000).
18. See infra Part II.B; see also Simon A. Rodell, Note, Plumbing in the Boardroom:
Plugging Boardroom Leaks Through a Good Faith Duty of Confidentiality, 59 FLA. L. REV. 631,
635, 638 n.37 (2007).
19. Disney II, 746 A.2d at 266.
20. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney III), 825 A.2d 275, 290–91 (Del. Ch.
2003).
21. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney V), 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005),
Sarbanes–Oxley’s impact on fiduciary duties under state law.  These14
scholars, however, have not thoroughly examined the Delaware courts’
response to the recent scandals. This Article will examine the Delaware
courts’ response and analyze its impact within the context of shareholder
derivative litigation.
Since the recent wave of corporate scandals, the Delaware courts have
applied new scrutiny to allow shareholder derivative actions to survive
pretrial motions asserting the business judgment rule defense. The long
history of In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation (Disney)
exemplifies Delaware’s “new” approach.  The Disney shareholders15
challenged the directors’ decisions regarding the compensation paid to the
company’s former president.  The Delaware Chancery Court originally16
dismissed the case,  and the dismissal was consistent with courts’17
historical practice of deferring to the compensation decisions of a board of
directors, a majority of which were disinterested in the transaction. The
Delaware Chancery Court thus granted the pretrial motion to dismiss
relying on the business judgment rule, which operates as a defense
preventing shareholders from challenging directors’ decisions unless the
shareholders can overcome the presumption that the directors acted
consistent with their fiduciary duties.  On appeal, the Delaware Supreme18
Court agreed that the case had been properly dismissed but gave the
plaintiffs leave to replead a portion of their complaint.  In the aftermath19
of the recent scandals, the Delaware Chancery Court denied the Disney
directors’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint.  The Disney20
plaintiffs ultimately survived multiple pretrial motions, conducted
discovery, and took the case to trial.  21
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aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). Although the Delaware Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the
finding that Disney’s board of directors did not breach their fiduciary duties, Disney VI, 906 A.2d
at 35–36, the case’s progression to trial illustrates the Delaware courts’ new trend.
22. See Mullen v. Acad. Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 973 n.3 (8th Cir. 1983) (“[C]ourts of
other states commonly look to Delaware law . . . for aid in fashioning rules of corporate law.”);
The Delaware courts’ motivations for applying new scrutiny to
directors’ decisions are obvious: First, they wanted to remedy the
corporate governance failures observed in the recent scandals. Second,
they wanted to stop federal regulation from supplanting state law’s ability
to govern corporations’ internal affairs. However, the Delaware courts’
changes are not obvious. Unlike the new requirements imposed by
Sarbanes–Oxley, the SEC, and the listing companies, the Delaware courts
have not defined any new requirements.
Recent Delaware opinions allow more cases to survive pretrial motions
asserting the business judgment rule defense, yet the opinions fail to
identify new liability standards. Instead, the Delaware courts have relied
on their prior broad descriptions of directors’ fiduciary duties and on an
evolving notion of “best practices.” Unfortunately, at the same time, the
courts have ignored the much lower standards of liability historically
applied when analyzing whether directors breached their fiduciary duties
to determine whether directors should receive the protection of the
business judgment rule. As a result, the Delaware courts have effectively
raised the requirements for dismissal based on the business judgment rule
and have given less deference to directors’ decisions. Thus, by failing to
define coherent standards for analyzing the business judgment rule while
allowing more cases to survive pretrial motions, the Delaware courts have
created doctrinal confusion and introduced unpredictability into derivative
litigation.
The uncertainty created by Delaware common law potentially harms
corporations, directors, shareholders, the investing public, and other
litigants. It leaves Delaware corporations and their directors bereft of
guidance on how to conduct themselves to receive protection from the
business judgment rule, and particularly how to receive such protection at
the earliest stages of future litigation. This uncertainty also impacts
directors’ decision-making authority and may lead directors to become
more risk averse. If directors fear taking reasonable business risks to
increase shareholder wealth, shareholders may be harmed. Shareholders
may also be harmed by a derivative action because all shareholders of a
corporation ultimately bear the litigation expenses, which could easily
outweigh the beneficial recovery, if any, for the corporation. In addition,
attorneys who file shareholder derivative lawsuits cannot accurately
evaluate the merits, the likelihood of success, or the settlement value of
potential lawsuits. Further, other state courts, which look to Delaware on
matters of corporate law,  lack guidance in evaluating assertions of the22
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Andrew D. Arons, In Defense of Defensive Devices: How Delaware Discouraged Preventive
Measures in Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 105, 130 (2004) (“[M]ost
states look towards Delaware’s corporate law decisions for guidance in their own holdings . . . .”).
23. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (noting that the law of the
state of incorporation “‘govern[s] the internal affairs of the corporation’” (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 84 (1975), abrogated on other grounds by Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560
(1979))).
business judgment rule for the entities incorporated in their states.  If23
more derivative actions survive pretrial motions, other litigants will also
be harmed because their cases will be delayed while the courts handle
lengthy derivative actions. Finally, potential investors may not invest in
stocks if derivative litigation causes the investors to lose confidence in
director-managed corporations. The only winners from the confusion and
uncertainty created by the Delaware courts are attorneys, who may bill
huge fees while litigating such cases.
Completely abolishing derivative actions, however, would also harm
corporations and shareholders. Shareholder derivative litigation provides
one of the few tools that shareholders can use to hold directors accountable
for their decisions. The threat of derivative litigation also potentially deters
directors from making decisions that are not in the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders. This deterrence function may enhance
corporate governance. At the same time, improvements are necessary to
remove the doctrinal chaos and unpredictability that the Delaware courts
have unnecessarily introduced into derivative litigation in response to
recent scandals.
Improvements could include enacting a statute to define the standards
for the business judgment rule and for alleged breaches of the fiduciary
duties. The business judgment rule supplies the pivotal defense for
corporations and directors in derivative litigation, and the defendant-
directors may assert the defense both in pretrial motions and at trial. If a
plaintiff cannot overcome the defense, the case ends. If the business
judgment rule continues to set the standard by which courts measure
directors’ actions in derivative litigation, then that standard must be
coherently and predictably applied by courts and potential litigants. The
standard must also provide proper deference to directors to protect
corporations and the majority of shareholders from those few shareholders
who want to second-guess, with the aid of hindsight, board decisions that
turned out poorly. Similarly, the standard must protect corporations and
shareholders from the few shareholders pursuing only personal interests
and from the plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking only the attorneys’ fees produced
by derivative litigation. Thus, the business judgment rule must afford a
plaintiff the opportunity to rebut the defense’s presumption in egregious
cases but must also set an appropriately high hurdle to prevent frivolous
and meritless litigation.
2008] CONFUSION AND UNPREDICTABILITY IN  SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION 595
24. See DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1.
25. A shareholder may file a derivative action on behalf of a corporation to enforce a cause
of action belonging to the corporation on account of an injury to the corporation. STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 8.2, at 362 (2002). A shareholder may file a
direct action if the cause of action belongs to the shareholder individually, for example in claims
involving oppression of minority shareholders. Id. § 8.2, at 362–63. This Article explicitly discusses
only derivative actions, although portions apply to direct actions as well.
26. See Fairfax, supra note 8, at 408 (“[T]he procedural rules related to shareholder suits for
fiduciary duty breaches make it difficult for shareholders to even bring an action challenging
director conduct . . . .”); Mark J. Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57
SMU L. REV. 353, 362 (2004) (“[D]erivative actions are fraught with difficulties.”).
27. Perhaps the most important hurdle for the potential shareholder-plaintiff is finding an
attorney willing to bring a shareholder derivative action. Under Delaware law, however, this may
not be much of a hurdle for the reasons discussed in Part V, infra.
Additionally, new requirements could be imposed to deter plaintiffs
from filing frivolous actions. The recent amendment of Delaware
Chancery Court Rule 23.1  attempts to deter such cases, but the rule does24
not go far enough. New procedural devices should also be implemented to
assess the business judgment rule early in litigation to terminate meritless
actions before the parties spend significant amounts of time and money.
Part II of this Article discusses the hurdles of shareholder derivative
litigation as well as the traditional formulations and justifications of the
business judgment rule. In Part III, this Article demonstrates the Delaware
courts’ recent willingness to allow shareholder derivative actions to
survive pretrial motions asserting the business judgment rule. Part IV
explains that, despite the apparent change in the assessment of the business
judgment rule when asserted in pretrial motions, the Delaware courts have
not changed the substantive law governing derivative litigation. Rather the
courts now rely on prior cases’ broad descriptions of “best practices” and
the standards of conduct for directors’ fiduciary duties, and not prior cases’
lower standards of liability for evaluating alleged breaches of those
fiduciary duties. Finally, Part V analyzes the potential negative
consequences from the doctrinal confusion and unpredictability that the
Delaware courts have injected into shareholder derivative litigation; Part
V then proposes several improvements to shareholder derivative litigation.
II. THE HURDLES OF SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
Currently, disgruntled shareholders wanting to bring a derivative
action  may face several procedural hurdles.  The two most significant25 26
procedural hurdles that shareholder-plaintiffs face are motions to dismiss
based on (1) the demand requirement or (2) the recommendation of a
special litigation committee. The business judgment rule defense lies at the
heart of both motions, and defendants can raise this defense in a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, a motion for summary judgment, or at
trial.27
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28. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”); MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2007) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the
authority of the board of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation
shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors,
subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation . . . .”). 
29. See, e.g., DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1.
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
31. See, e.g., id.
32. See Fairfax, supra note 8, at 408.
33. Id. (noting that most boards “decide not to bring any action”).
34. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, § 8.5, at 395; see also Fairfax, supra note 8, at 408
(“[A]lthough shareholders can challenge [directors’ rejection of a demand request], most courts
defer to boards on this matter.”).
35. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, § 8.5, at 395.
36. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814–15 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner (Disney II), 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
37. Id.
A.  The Demand Requirement and the Special Litigation Committee
The demand requirement provides the first procedural hurdle for a
shareholder-plaintiff. By statute, corporate directors possess the authority
to manage the corporation; thus, directors have authority to decide whether
to pursue a lawsuit on behalf of the corporation.  Most states require a28
shareholder to make a demand on the board of directors before bringing
a derivative action on behalf of the corporation.  Similarly, shareholder-29
plaintiffs may not sue in federal court unless they first make a demand on
the board of directors.  A demand simply requests that the board rectify30
the challenged decision.  Thus, a shareholder typically must exhaust all31
available means to obtain relief through the corporation before filing a
lawsuit on behalf of the corporation. 
Upon receiving a shareholder demand, a board of directors can take one
of three courses of action: (1) accept the demand and prosecute the claim
itself, (2) resolve the matter internally, or (3) reject the demand.32
Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that boards typically reject the
demand.  If the board rejects the demand, the shareholder may seek33
judicial review but must prove that the board rejected the demand
wrongfully.  The business judgment rule defense provides the relevant34
standard for reviewing the board’s rejection.35
Courts will excuse the demand requirement, however, if the demand
would be futile.  A court may excuse demand as futile if a majority of the36
directors either allegedly participated in the challenged decision or are
otherwise interested in the challenged transaction.  In other words,37
excusal from demand requires the plaintiff to show that the business
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38. Beneville v. York, 769 A.2d 80, 85 n.9 (Del. Ch. 2000).
39. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
40. Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
VAND. L. REV. 83, 97 n.85 (2004) (“Note that mere allegations of director impropriety do not
entitle plaintiff to discovery. Accordingly, business judgment rule claims should be determined as
a motion to dismiss on the pleadings rather than at the summary judgment stage.” (citation
omitted)).
41. See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 n.11 (Del. 1996) (describing shareholders’
“tools at hand” to include public sources, such as the media and governmental agencies, and the
right to inspect corporate records), overruled on other grounds by Disney II, 746 A.2d 244; Rales
v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934–35 n.10 (Del. 1993) (same); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 220(b) (2008) (providing for a shareholder’s right to inspect corporate records); MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 16.02 (2007) (same).
42. Similarly, defendants may raise a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. McMullin
v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 918 (Del. 2000) (holding that the business judgment rule protects directors
“unless effectively pled factual allegations in the . . . [c]omplaint successfully rebut the procedural
presumption of the business judgment rule”).
43. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, § 8.5, at 393–94.
44. Id. § 8.5, at 395.
45. Id. § 8.5, at 393–94.
judgment rule does not apply to the board’s decision.  Consequently, if a38
shareholder files suit without making a demand on the board, the
shareholder must show that demand should be excused as futile by
pleading particular facts sufficient to rebut the presumption of the business
judgment rule.  Although plaintiffs may argue that they confront39
difficulties alleging such facts with particularity in advance of taking
discovery, such arguments typically fail.  Courts state that plaintiffs40
already possess the tools for gathering sufficient evidence through the
shareholders’ right to inspect the corporation’s books, which include the
minutes of meetings of the board of directors.41
Director-defendants will typically file a motion to dismiss on the
demand requirement soon after a derivative action begins.  In cases where42
the plaintiff made a demand that the board rejected, the issue is whether
that rejection was wrongful. In cases where the plaintiff failed to make a
demand, the issue is whether demand should be excused. In these latter
cases, if the shareholder wins and demand is excused, the lawsuit
continues. If the shareholder loses, however, then the shareholder must
make a demand on the board.  Assuming the board rejects the demand,43
the shareholder-plaintiff must prove that the board wrongly rejected the
demand.  The shareholder then is in the same position as if the44
shareholder, before filing suit, had made a demand that the board rejected.
Thus, most shareholders forego making a demand on the board of directors
and file their shareholder derivative actions hoping that the court will
excuse demand.45
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46. Douglas M. Branson, W. Edward Sell Chair in Law, Univ. of Pittsburgh, The Indiana
Supreme Court Lecture: The Rule That Isn’t a Rule—The Business Judgment Rule (Sept. 20,
2001), in 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 647–48 (2002). An SLC may have reason to believe that
dismissing the lawsuit is in the corporation’s best interest because dismissing a derivative action
might increase stock price. See Fischel & Bradley, supra note 10, at 279.
47. Branson, supra note 46, at 648 (footnote omitted).
48. In New York and other states, the plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting the business
judgment rule presumption with respect to the SLC’s decision, and judicial inquiry is limited to the
disinterestedness and independence of the SLC’s members and the adequacy of their investigation.
See Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 996, 1001 (N.Y. 1979); see also Finley v. Superior
Court, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 128, 132 (Ct. App. 2000) (stating that a court should dismiss a derivative
action upon an SLC’s recommendation if the SLC members were independent and adequately
A second hurdle faces some shareholder-plaintiffs—the possibility that
a special litigation committee (SLC), composed of independent and
disinterested directors, will move to dismiss the action based on the SLC’s
recommendation that continuing the litigation would not be in the
corporation’s best interests.  One commentator has described the46
formation and nature of an SLC as follows:
If a shareholder brought colorable claims against some of the
directors, counsel would first instruct the board of directors
to amend the corporation’s bylaws, increasing the number of
directors. Second, the board would appoint two or three
“expansion” directors to the positions so created who could
have had no possible connection to the alleged wrongdoing
and who, in addition, often would be “purer than the driven
snow.” Third, the full board would delegate to the committee
all the board’s power to deal with the pending action or
shareholder demand that an action be brought. Once
convened, the SLC would then hire an independent law firm
to conduct a factual investigation of the shareholder’s
allegations and to research the applicable law. The firm
would report periodically to the SLC and involve SLC
members in the investigation, at least at crucial stages. In the
typical scenario, eight or ten months later the SLC will
promulgate a report, which it files with the court. Appended
to the report will be a voluminous report of the investigation
and a legal memorandum. By motion for summary judgment,
the SLC will then ask the court to dismiss the shareholder
action as having been found by the SLC “not in the
corporation’s best interests.”47
When an SLC recommends that continuing the lawsuit would not be in the
best interests of the corporation and then moves to dismiss based upon that
recommendation, most courts afford that recommendation business
judgment rule protection.  Under this deferential review, courts rely on48
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investigated the challenged decision); Cutshall v. Barker, 733 N.E.2d 973, 978 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)
(stating that to avoid dismissal, shareholder-plaintiffs have the burden of proving that the
committee was not disinterested or did not conduct a good-faith investigation); Janssen v. Best &
Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 884 (Minn. 2003) (extending business judgment deference to the
committee’s decision as long as the committee is disinterested and informs itself fully on the
issues). Some states also give business judgment rule protection to an SLC recommendation but
appear to place the burden of proof on the defendants. See, e.g., Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty
Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 378–79 (6th Cir. 1984) (stating that a court should dismiss a derivative
action upon an SLC’s recommendation if the defendants show they reasonably investigated, were
independent, and acted in good faith); Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)
(stating that a derivative action should be dismissed only after the court (1) finds that the committee
was independent and (2) critically reviews the committee’s findings to determine they are made in
good faith, supported by the record of the investigation, and are consistent with the best interests
of the corporation). In Delaware, by contrast, the defendant bears the burden of proving the
independence and good faith of the SLC, and the court may inquire into the bases supporting the
SLC’s recommendation and may apply its own business judgment as to whether the case should
be dismissed. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787–89 (Del. 1981).
49. Fairfax, supra note 8, at 409 (citing Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and
Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1356–58
(1993)).
50. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.) (Disney VI), 906 A.2d 27, 52
(Del. 2006).
51. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney V), 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch.
2005) (holding, after a lengthy trial, that the defendants were entitled to business judgment rule
protection), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); In re BHC Commc’ns, Inc. S’holder Litig., 789 A.2d
1, 4 (Del. Ch. 2001) (“[I]t is a bedrock principle of Delaware corporate law that, where a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty fails to contain allegations of fact that, if true, would rebut the presumption
of the business judgment rule, that claim should ordinarily be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).”);
Weinberger v. United Fin. Corp. of Calif., Civ. A. No. 5915 (1979), 1983 WL 20290, at *6 (Del.
the SLC’s recommendation and grant the motion “in the vast majority of
cases.”49
A motion to dismiss based on the demand requirement and a motion to
dismiss based on an SLC recommendation both ultimately involve the
business judgment rule. The business judgment rule thus arises as a hurdle
for shareholders at the beginning of a lawsuit and at any point in litigation
when an SLC moves to dismiss the lawsuit. Directors may also assert the
business judgment rule in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
a motion for summary judgment, or at trial. Therefore, a shareholder-
plaintiff will inevitably encounter the business judgment rule.
B.  The Business Judgment Rule Defense
At its most basic, the business judgment rule supplies a defense in
shareholder derivative actions that challenge a decision by a corporation’s
board of directors.  Defendants currently may assert the business50
judgment rule on a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment, or
at trial.  The business judgment rule has existed in American corporate51
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Ch. Oct. 13, 1983) (noting that to defeat a summary judgment motion, a plaintiff can “allude to
facts in the record which are undisputed or which are disputed but, if true, are sufficient to rebut
the presumption” of the business judgment rule).
52. S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 93
(1979) (stating that the business judgment rule is “a common law principle of corporate governance
that has been part of corporate law for at least 150 years”); see Branson, supra note 46, at 633
(stating that the business judgment rule “remains an exclusively American legal construct” with the
exception of Australia which enacted a version of the rule in 1999).
53. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003) (“‘The business
judgment rule, as a standard of judicial review, is a common-law recognition of the statutory
authority to manage a corporation that is vested in the board of directors.’” (quoting MM Cos. v.
Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003))); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872
(Del. 1985) (stating that the business judgment rule “protect[s] and promote[s] the full and free
exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware directors”).
54. See 1 A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 cmt. d (1994) (stating that the business judgment rule protects directors
“from the risks inherent in hindsight reviews of their unsuccessful decisions” and avoids “stifling
innovation and venturesome business activity”); Arsht, supra note 52, at 95 (stating that the
business judgment rule recognizes that “as human beings, directors are not infallible” and “the need
to foster both business and judicial economy by not allowing every corporate transaction to be
subject to judicial review at the request of a disagreeing stockholder”). 
55. See Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 110 (stating that encouraging risk-taking justifies the
business judgment rule); see also Branson, supra note 46, at 637 (“Once on the board, a strong
business judgment rule is necessary to encourage those independent directors to engage in the type
of informed risk taking that is essential to business success.”); id. at 632 (stating that the business
judgment rule is “built upon economic freedom and the encouragement of informed risk taking”);
Len Costa, Boss of the Bosses: Delaware’s Most Important Judge Takes on Greedy Executives,
Congress, and the History of Corporate Law, LEGAL AFF., July/Aug. 2005, at 43, 46 (“More than
most judicial institutions, the Delaware Chancery Court doesn’t second-guess decisions made by
informed, disinterested boards, for fear of chilling commerce and innovation.”).
56. Arsht, supra note 52, at 97 (“The business judgment rule grew principally from the
judicial concern that persons of reason, intellect, and integrity would not serve as directors if the
law exacted from them a degree of prescience not possessed by people of ordinary knowledge.”);
R. Franklin Balotti & Mark J. Gentile, Elimination or Limitation of Director Liability for Delaware
Corporations, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 9 (1987) (“The general result has been that many qualified
individuals have refused to serve as directors.”).
57. Fairfax, supra note 8, at 410; see Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich.
1919) (“The judges are not business experts.”); Branson, supra note 46, at 637 (stating that “courts
common law since at least the mid-1800s  and is based largely on two52
general rationales. First, the business judgment rule provides the protection
necessary for directors to carry out their responsibility to manage the
corporation  without fear of shareholders second-guessing directors’53
decisions with the benefit of hindsight.  If directors feared derivative54
litigation from every board decision, then directors might not take
calculated business risks.  Some commentators further suggest that55
individuals would not serve as directors without the protection of the
business judgment rule.  Second, directors are “better-suited than courts56
to make business decisions.”  Thus, the rule protects directors from57
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are ill-equipped to review business decisions” because the decisions “often involve intangibles,
intuitive insights or surmises as to business matters such as competitive outlook, cost structure, and
economic and industry trends” and are “not susceptible to systematic analysis”). This judicial
deference for business decisions is difficult to justify, because courts frequently review decisions
of physicians, surgeons, psychiatrists, and engineers. See Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 120 (noting
that “no ‘medical judgment’ or ‘design judgment’ rule precludes judicial review of malpractice or
product liability cases”); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 94 (1991) (asking why “the same judges who decide whether
engineers have designed the compressors on jet engines properly . . . cannot decide whether a
manager negligently failed to sack a subordinate who made improvident loans”); Hal R. Arkes &
Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight
Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 613–17 (1994) (discussing the differences between courts’ review of
business and medical decisions); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule,
2000 WIS. L. REV. 573, 581 (“[J]udges should find it far easier to overcome the barrier of expertise
and stand in the shoes of outside directors than in those of almost any of the other professionals
whose actions courts are routinely called upon to review.”).
58. Arsht, supra note 52, at 96; see also Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 113–14 (“Business
decisions rarely involve black-and-white issues; instead, they typically involve prudential
judgments among a number of plausible alternatives. Given the vagaries of business, moreover,
even carefully made choices among such alternatives may turn out badly.” (footnote omitted)).
59. See Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 83–84 (“Countless cases invoke it and countless
scholars have analyzed it. Yet, despite all of the attention lavished on it, the business judgment rule
remains poorly understood.” (footnote omitted)); see also Davis, supra note 57, at 573 (noting that
“thousands of pages of corporate law scholarship and commentary have been devoted to” the
business judgment rule, “yet we remain short of any broad consensus” on its rationale); Henry G.
Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 270 (1967)
(stating that the business judgment rule is “one of the least understood concepts in the entire
corporate field”).
60. Many commentators agree with the courts’ formulation of the business judgment rule as
a standard of liability or a standard of review, which operates as a burden-shifting scheme. See, e.g.,
Arsht, supra note 52, at 133; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 444–45 (1993). Other
commentators believe that this view of the rule does nothing more than restate the principle that
defendants are entitled to summary judgment when the plaintiff fails to make a prima facie case,
and these commentators advocate that the rule instead should be viewed as an abstention doctrine.
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 101; id. at 87 (“[T]he rule is better understood as a doctrine
of abstention . . . .”); D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and Executive
Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 830 (2007) (advocating that the business judgment rule “be
aggressively conceived as a doctrine of abstention”). As Disney demonstrates, however, the
Delaware courts are sticking with the burden-shifting scheme. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney
Co. Derivative Litig.) (Disney VI), 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Disney VI, 906 A.2d 27).
liability “for honest mistakes of judgment or unpopular business
decisions.”  Despite expansive attention from courts, academics, and58
practitioners, the business judgment rule remains heavily debated —the59
principal point of contention being how courts should apply the rule.60
As articulated by the Delaware courts, the business judgment rule
creates a presumption that directors have acted in accordance with their
fiduciary duties in making corporate decisions, and plaintiffs may rebut
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61. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see also McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916–17 (Del.
2000) (“Procedurally, the initial burden is on the shareholder plaintiff to rebut the presumption of
the business judgment rule. To meet that burden, the shareholder plaintiff must effectively provide
evidence that the defendant board of directors, in reaching its challenged decision, breached any
one of its ‘triad of fiduciary duties, loyalty, good faith or due care.’ Substantively, ‘if the
shareholder plaintiff fails to meet that evidentiary burden, the business judgment rule attaches’ and
operates to protect the individual director-defendants from personal liability for making the board
decision at issue.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1221
(Del. 1999) (“A breach of any one of the board of directors’ triad of fiduciary duties, loyalty, good
faith or due care, sufficiently rebuts the business judgment presumption and permits a challenge
to the board’s action under the entire fairness standard.”) and Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634
A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993))). But see R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the
Business Judgment Rule, 48 BUS.LAW. 1337, 1345 (1993) (arguing that the business judgment rule
does not provide a presumption “in the strict evidentiary sense of the term”).
62. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989) (citing
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985)).
63. Disney VI, 906 A.2d at 52; Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 90–91; Cede, 634 A.2d at 361;
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
64. Disney VI, 906 A.2d at 52; Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 90–91; Cede, 634 A.2d at 361;
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
65. Paglin v. Saztec Int’l, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1184, 1200 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (“[T]he business
judgment rule does not apply when the act complained of is ultra vires, illegal, or fraudulent.”);
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (“‘The directors are chosen to pass
upon [questions of policy and business management] and their judgment unless shown to be tainted
with fraud is accepted as final.’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co.,
142 A. 654, 659 (Del. Ch. 1928))); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (Sup. Ct.
1976) (noting that courts will not substitute their judgment for that of directors absent “fraud,
dishonesty, or nonfeasance”).
that presumption by showing fraud, illegality, waste, or breach of a
fiduciary duty.  If the plaintiff fails to rebut the presumption, then the61
business judgment rule protects the directors and their decision.62
However, if the plaintiff shows either that the director-defendants violated
a fiduciary duty or that the business judgment rule does not apply because
the defendants committed an act of fraud, illegality, or waste, then the
presumption of the business judgment rule is rebutted.  Once the plaintiff63
rebuts the presumption, the directors must prove to the fact-finder that the
challenged transaction was “entirely fair” to the corporation and its
shareholders.64
Therefore, shareholder-plaintiffs have essentially two methods by
which they may rebut an assertion of the business judgment rule. First, the
plaintiff may show that the directors breached one or more of their
fiduciary duties. Second, the plaintiff may show that the business judgment
rule does not apply to the directors’ actions because the actions were
fraudulent, illegal, or wasteful.  In Disney, the Delaware Supreme Court65
endorsed this formulation of the business judgment rule. The court’s
analysis of the plaintiffs’ waste allegation was separate from the analysis
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66. Disney VI, 906 A.2d at 73–74 (“This claim is rooted in the doctrine that a plaintiff who
fails to rebut the business judgment rule presumptions is not entitled to any remedy unless the
transaction constitutes waste.”).
67. Id. at 52 (footnote omitted) (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812).
68. Arsht, supra note 52, at 96 (“[The business judgment rule’s] significance lies also in the
limitations to its availability as a defense to liability and the standard of directorial conduct those
limitations establish. Far from constituting a shield from liability for fraud, mismanagement, or
reckless decisions, the limitations on the business judgment rule’s application impose significant
duties on a director in the performance of his or her office.” (footnote omitted)).
69. FRANKEL, supra note 11, at 183–84 (“There are some departures from the historical
strong protection of corporate boards. For example, in the past two decades, the Delaware
courts . . . were reluctant to make corporate directors liable for the wrongs committed by their
corporations. The courts respected the directors’ business judgment and, with a few notable
exceptions, shielded the directors from the claims of shareholders.”); Fairfax, supra note 8, at 409
(“[T]he tremendous deference courts grant to board decisions means that courts hold directors liable
for only the most egregious examples of director misconduct.”).
70. See FRANKEL, supra note 11, at 158 (“[T]he Delaware Court has begun to show far less
deference to corporate management.”); see also Costa, supra note 55, at 46 (“The parade of recent
corporate scandals has further strained the notion that directors always know best. The Chancery
Court has taken notice: Questionable behavior that might once have been dismissed under the
business judgment rule is attracting a critical eye.”).
of whether the plaintiffs had rebutted the business judgment rule by
showing a breach of fiduciary duty.  In analyzing the business judgment66
rule, the Delaware Supreme Court stated:
Our law presumes that “in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company.” Those presumptions can be
rebutted if the plaintiff shows that the directors breached their
fiduciary duty of care or of loyalty or acted in bad faith. If
that is shown, the burden then shifts to the director defendants
to demonstrate that the challenged act or transaction was
entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders.67
Thus, the fiduciary duties imposed on directors supply the principal
limitations on the business judgment rule.68
III. DELAWARE COURTS HAVE LOWERED THE HURDLES OF
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION    
In the past, courts rarely rejected assertions of the business judgment
rule.  However, some of that judicial deference has disappeared since the69
recent corporate scandals.  Nonetheless, the Delaware courts have not70
announced new liability standards or a new framework for analyzing the
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71. FRANKEL, supra note 11, at 184 (“In the past few years, the Delaware courts have shown
that they can change their attitude in response to abuses. Of the five large shareholders’ suits
brought since 2002, all five were allowed to proceed. The tone of the courts has changed.” (footnote
omitted)); see Fairfax, supra note 8, at 418 (“Former Delaware Chancery Court judge William
Allen confirmed the impact that Enron and Sarbanes–Oxley had on Delaware courts’ willingness
to increase directors’ liability in order to ensure greater adherence to directors’ fiduciary
responsibilities.” (citing Marc Gunther, Ovitz v. Eisner: Boards Beware!, FORTUNE, Nov. 10, 2003,
at 171, 176)).
72. See John Gibeaut, Stock Responses: Shareholders Ask for Changes in Corporate
Governance, and the Courts Are Starting to See It Their Way, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2003, at 38, 40
(quoting the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court).
73. Id. (quoting the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court).
74. See Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform,
29 J. CORP. L. 625, 625 (2004); id. at 640–63 (discussing Sarbanes–Oxley, corporate scandals, and
the judicial response in Delaware state courts); see also Ed Aro et al., Commentary, Back to the
Future: Coping with Post-Enron Attitude Changes of Judges and Juries, ANDREWS CORP.OFFICERS
& DIRECTORS LIABILITY LITIG. REP., Jan. 13, 2004, at 17 (discussing judges’ willingness after
Sarbanes–Oxley and recent corporate scandals to regulate corporate conduct once thought to have
been beyond judicial scrutiny). 
75. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney III), 825 A.2d 275, 277–78 (Del. Ch.
2003) (stating the amended complaint’s allegations).
76. See id.
77. Id. at 279.
78. Id.
business judgment rule. Nor have the Delaware courts stated new liability
standards for alleged breaches of the fiduciary duties of care or loyalty.
Yet, judicial enforcement of these standards has shifted.71
The Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court has acknowledged
that Delaware courts are applying “new scrutiny,” yet the “‘same law,’”
to defendants in derivative actions.  He also stated that the Delaware72
courts’ “‘expectations of directors are evolving’” in light of recent
corporate governance developments.  Recent cases demonstrate that the73
Delaware courts have given less deference to directors’ decisions and have
raised the requirements for directors to prevail on the business judgment
rule in pretrial motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and
motions for preliminary injunctions.74
In Disney, the shareholder-plaintiffs alleged that the director-
defendants breached their fiduciary duties in dealing with the company’s
former president, Michael Ovitz, a long-time friend of Disney’s CEO and
chairman, Michael Eisner.  Specifically, the directors allegedly breached75
their duties by approving Ovitz’s hiring and later his severance payment.76
After only fourteen months with Disney, Ovitz received a $140 million
termination payment.  According to the plaintiffs, the directors approved77
the payment based only upon a summary of terms and conditions of the
employment agreement and a brief discussion during two board
meetings.  Thus, the directors’ approval allegedly breached their fiduciary78
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79. Id. at 287–89. The shareholder-plaintiffs alleged that Ovitz should have been terminated
for cause and thus that Ovitz should not have received the severance payment available only for
a without-cause termination. See id.
80. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 731 A.2d 342, 350 (Del. Ch. 1998)
(emphasis omitted), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner (Disney II), 746 A.2d 244
(Del. 2000). 
81. Disney II, 746 A.2d at 267.
82. Disney III, 825 A.2d at 278.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 286–87 (emphasis omitted).
85. Id. at 289 (emphasis omitted).
86. Id. (emphasis omitted).
87. Id.
duties because the directors did not (1) ask any questions about the
payment, (2) review any documents, (3) consult experts, or (4) consider
whether Ovitz should receive a severance payment for a “non-fault
termination.”79
When the Disney defendants moved to dismiss the original complaint,
the Delaware Chancery Court granted the motion stating that “courts [do
not] overrule a board’s decision to approve and later honor a severance
package, merely because of its size.”  On appeal, the Delaware Supreme80
Court agreed that the Delaware Chancery Court had properly dismissed the
case but gave the plaintiffs leave to replead portions of their complaint.81
The Disney shareholder-plaintiffs subsequently amended their
complaint to allege breaches of the duties of care and good faith for the
same conduct, and the directors responded by again moving to dismiss the
action based on the business judgment rule.  This second motion to82
dismiss occurred in the aftermath of Enron and WorldCom, and the
Delaware Chancery Court denied the motion.  The court concluded that83
“the new complaint . . . gives rise to a reason to doubt whether the board’s
actions were taken honestly and in good faith” and that “the facts belie any
assertion that the [directors] exercised any business judgment or made any
good faith attempt to fulfill the fiduciary duties they owed to Disney and
its shareholders.”84
Delaware’s change in evaluating the business judgment rule on pretrial
motions can be seen in the court’s statement that “[t]hese facts, if
true . . . suggest that the defendant directors consciously and intentionally
disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t care about the
risks’ attitude concerning a material corporate decision.”  The Delaware85
Chancery Court further noted that the alleged facts “impl[ied] that the
defendant directors knew that they were making material decisions
without adequate information and without adequate deliberation, and that
they simply did not care if the decisions caused the corporation and its
stockholders to suffer injury or loss.”  Because the alleged facts gave “a86
reason to doubt business judgment protection,” the Delaware Chancery
Court denied the motion to dismiss.87
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88. After discovery, Michael Ovitz moved for summary judgment, which the Delaware
Chancery Court granted in part and denied in part. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney
IV), No. Civ. A. 15452, 2004 WL 2050138, at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2004). The trial occurred
between October 2004 and January 2005. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney V), 907
A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
89. Disney V, 907 A.2d at 697; id. at 763 (noting that conduct that falls “short of what
shareholders expect and demand from those entrusted with a fiduciary position” and conduct that
“does not comport with how fiduciaries of Delaware corporations are expected to act” cannot be
sanctioned because such conduct is “not in violation of law”).
90. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.) (Disney VI), 906 A.2d 27, 75
(Del. 2006); id. at 56 (comparing what happened in Disney “to what would have occurred had the
committee followed a ‘best practices’ (or ‘best case’) scenario”).
91. 802 A.2d 257 (Del. 2002).
92. Id. at 266.
93. Id. at 261.
94. Id. at 259. 
95. Id. at 264.
96. Id. at 259.
97. Id.
Having survived multiple pretrial motions, the Disney plaintiffs
completed discovery and took their case to trial years later.  In the end,88
however, the plaintiffs’ fate was no different than it would have been
before the recent corporate scandals. After a four-month trial, the
Delaware Chancery Court determined that, although Disney’s directors did
not comply with “best practices of ideal corporate governance,” they “did
not breach their fiduciary duties or commit waste.”  The Delaware89
Supreme Court affirmed on appeal.  Despite the Disney plaintiffs’90
ultimate loss, they were able to pursue their claims much further than they
would have in the past.
The Disney litigation and other recent cases illustrate the new trend in
Delaware courts. For example, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed a
grant of summary judgment on a duty-of-loyalty claim in Telxon Corp. v.
Meyerson,  finding reasonable doubt existed about the directors’91
disinterestedness and independence.  Telxon had bought all the stock of92
a technology company owned by Telxon’s chairman of the board,
Meyerson, to induce him to serve as Telxon’s CEO.  Shareholders filed93
a derivative action challenging the board’s decision on grounds that the
directors breached their duties of care and loyalty.  The shareholders94
alleged that Meyerson controlled the Telxon board.  Meyerson and the95
other director-defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
business judgment rule foreclosed the derivative action because a majority
of the disinterested directors approved the transaction.  The Delaware96
Chancery Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
all claims except for the duty-of-care claim.  On appeal, the Delaware97
Supreme Court reversed, finding material issues of fact existed about
whether Meyerson dominated or controlled Telxon’s board: 
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98. Id. at 264–65.
99. Id. at 265.
100. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court also reversed the Delaware Chancery Court’s grant of
summary judgment to the directors on the plaintiff’s allegation that the compensation paid to the
directors during this period was excessive, stating that directors must make “an affirmative showing
that the compensation arrangements are fair to the corporation.” Id. at 265–66.
101. Nos. 466,2002 & 467,2002, 2002 WL 1859064 (Del. Aug. 13, 2002).
102. Id. at *1.
103. Id. at *1–2.
104. Id. at *2.
105. Id.
Telxon argues a majority of the other Directors were
beholden to Meyerson, as Telxon’s executive Chairman of
the Board and “most senior executive,” because he was in a
position to affect their livelihood. Meyerson did play an
integral role in Telxon’s management for many years, both
during and after his stint as CEO, and it is clear that the other
Directors respected his business acumen and often relied
upon his counsel. Additionally, [one director’s] law firm
derived a substantial portion of its revenue from Meyerson
and his businesses. Given the state of the record, however, we
cannot say whether or not the other Directors acted
independently or were beholden to Meyerson such that they
deferred to his will in the [challenged transaction].98
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the shareholders’ contentions
“represent[ed] a disputed fact that should be resolved only after a trial at
which all the facts are presented and the credibility of all the witnesses
tested.”  The court noted that “[o]nly after a full picture of Meyerson’s99
relationship with the other Directors is developed can their independence
be ascertained.”  Therefore, both the duty-of-care claim and the duty-of-100
loyalty claim survived the pretrial motion.
In another recent case, Levco Alternative Fund Ltd. v. Reader’s Digest
Ass’n,  the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction based on allegations101
that the directors breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty in approving a
proposed recapitalization.  The Delaware Chancery Court denied a102
preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiffs had not established
a likelihood of success on the merits of their fiduciary-duty claim because
the evidence did not suggest that the directors lacked independence or that
the transaction was unfair to the stockholders.  The Delaware Supreme103
Court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs had rebutted the business
judgment rule presumption because the directors were not disinterested.104
Thus, the directors bore the burden of “establishing entire fairness” as “the
party who stands on both sides of the transaction.”105
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106. Nos. 605,2002 & 649,2002, 2002 WL 31767892 (Del. Dec. 10, 2002).
107. Id. at *2.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. No. Civ. A. 19028, 2003 WL 139768 (Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 2003).
111. Id. at *14.
112. Id.
113. Id. at *15.
114. Other Delaware cases also reflect this trend of denying pretrial motions asserting the
business judgment defense and permitting the plaintiffs to reach the discovery stage. See, e.g., In
re InfoUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A 1956-CC, 2006 WL 2419661, at *23 (Del. Ch. Aug.
20, 2007) (denying a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim by finding that the complaint
stated a claim for self-dealing transactions); In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919
A.2d 563, 593 (Del. Ch. 2007) (denying a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, in part,
finding that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged breaches of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and
good faith); Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 358 (Del. Ch. 2007) (denying a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim and stating that the shareholder’s allegations of breach of fiduciary duty
were sufficient to rebut the business judgment rule); Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 669 (Del.
Ch. 2007) (denying a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and finding the allegation of
waste sufficient to overcome the presumption of the business judgment rule); In re Primedia Inc.
Derivative Litig., 910 A.2d 248, 250 (Del. Ch. 2006) (denying a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim because the court could reasonably infer self-dealing in breach of the duty of loyalty);
Feldman v. Cutaia, Civ. A. No. 1656-N, 2006 WL 920420, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 2006)
(denying a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on claims of breach of the duty of loyalty
and the duty of candor); In re LNR Prop. Corp. S’holders Litig., 896 A.2d 169, 171 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(denying a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because the complaint stated a breach of
fiduciary-duty claim); Orloff v. Shulman, No. Civ. A. 852-N, 2005 WL 3272355, at *13–14 (Del.
In Omni Care, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.,  the Delaware Supreme106
Court reversed the denial of a preliminary injunction, finding that the
director-defendants had breached their fiduciary duties by agreeing to
merge with Genesis Health Ventures, Inc.  The court found that the107
directors “irrevocably locked up” the merger “by approving the Voting
Agreements [that] assured shareholder approval” and “by agreeing to a
provision requiring that the merger be presented to the shareholders.”108
The court concluded that these actions “precluded the directors from
exercising their continuing fiduciary obligation to negotiate a sale of the
company in the interest of the shareholders.”109
In re National Auto Credit, Inc. Shareholders Litigation  involved110
allegations that the directors’ decision on the company’s CEO’s
compensation constituted waste because (1) “the relative size of the
compensation” was disproportionate in comparison to the value of the
company, (2) the company “no longer ha[d] an active business to
manage,” and (3) the company “was paying [the CEO] essentially to sit
idle.”  In response, the directors moved to dismiss the case, claiming that111
their compensation decisions were “protected by the business judgment
rule.”  The Delaware Chancery Court refused to dismiss the112
plaintiffs’ waste allegations on business judgment rule grounds.113
As demonstrated by these recent cases, among others,  the Delaware114
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Ch. Nov. 23, 2005) (denying a motion to dismiss in part by finding that the plaintiffs should have
the opportunity to conduct discovery on their claims of waste and breaches of fiduciary duty); In
re Freeport-McMoran Sulphur, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. Civ. A. 16729, 2005 WL 1653923, at *1
(Del. Ch. June 30, 2005) (denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment where the
complaint alleged that directors breached their fiduciary duties by approving a merger); Tooley v.
AXA Fin., Inc., No. 18414, 2005 WL 1252378, at *7 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2005) (denying a motion
to dismiss and ruling that the plaintiff had “overcome the presumption of the business judgment
rule”). 
115. See Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.) (Disney VI), 906 A.2d 27,
52 (Del. 2006); see also Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90–91 (Del. 2001) (describing
a “triad of fiduciary duties: due care, loyalty, [and] good faith”).
116. Disney VI, at 55; id. at 56 (comparing what happened in Disney “to what would have
occurred had the committee followed a ‘best practices’ (or ‘best case’) scenario”). 
courts now more closely scrutinize directors’ assertions of the business
judgment rule in pretrial motions. The Delaware courts’ rulings on the
pretrial motions in these cases also show an increased willingness to allow
shareholder-plaintiffs the opportunity to reach discovery and potentially
trial in cases that would have traditionally ended on pretrial motions
asserting the business judgment rule.
IV. HOW THE DELAWARE COURTS HAVE LOWERED THE HURDLES OF
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION WITHOUT CHANGING
THE LIABILITY STANDARDS
In these recent Delaware cases, the courts did not announce any new
standards of legal liability. The courts did not state any new standards for
applying the business judgment rule or evaluating alleged fiduciary-duty
breaches in pretrial motions. Instead, the courts relied on their prior broad
descriptions of directors’ fiduciary duties to deny pretrial motions
asserting the business judgment rule. These courts also ignored their
historically narrow analyses of alleged breaches of those duties and their
past deferential view of directors’ assertions of the business judgment rule.
This Part explains the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith115
that underlie the business judgment rule, and the categories to which the
rule does not apply. This Part also contrasts the courts’ high standards of
conduct for directors’ fiduciary duties and the much lower standards of
liability for evaluating alleged breaches of those duties. Disney
demonstrates this contrast as both the Delaware Supreme Court and the
Delaware Chancery Court recognized two different standards: the best
corporate practices that directors should comply with when making
decisions and the lower legal liability standard that directors will be judged
against in litigation. Although both courts determined that Disney’s
directors did not comply with best corporate practices and rejected the
pretrial assertions of the business judgment rule, both courts ultimately
agreed that the directors did not breach any fiduciary duty and thus were
entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule.116
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117. See Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147 (1891) (stating that directors have a duty to
“supervise the business with attention . . . [and] to use proper care in the appointment of agents”);
see also Fairfax, supra note 8, at 397 (“[D]irectors have an obligation to monitor corporate actors
and remain informed about corporate operations.”); Veasey, supra note 1, at 445 ( “[I]t goes
without saying that directors must be careful and work hard to understand the facts behind that
which they are deciding.”).
118. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney V), 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(quoting Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) and Brehm v. Eisner
(Disney II), 746 A.2d 244, 259 (Del. 2000)), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27, 55 (Del. 2006); see Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (stating that directors have a duty to “act in an informed
and deliberate manner”); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“[D]irectors have a
duty to inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material information
reasonably available to them.”), overruled on other grounds by Disney II, 746 A.2d 244.
119. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 (“Under the business judgment rule there is no protection
for directors who have made ‘an unintelligent and unadvised judgment.’” (quoting Mitchell v.
Highland-W. Glass Co., 167 A. 831, 833 (Del. Ch. 1933))); see Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993) (holding that directors violated their duty of care because they were
not “adequately inform[ed]” of all material information reasonably available before approving a
merger agreement).
120. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821–22 (N.J. 1981). 
121. See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 922 (Del. 2000).
122. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.) (Disney VI), 906 A.2d 27, 74
(Del. 2006) (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)). 
123. See id.; see also Disney II, 746 A.2d at 264 (“Irrationality is the outer limit of the
A.  The Duty of Care
Courts have explained the standard of conduct imposed by the duty of
care in a variety of ways. Basically, the duty places an affirmative
obligation on the directors to protect the interests of the corporation and
its shareholders when making decisions on behalf of the corporation. Thus,
directors must critically assess relevant information before making a
decision.  Courts have stated that the duty of care requires directors to117
“‘use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would
use in similar circumstances’” and to “‘consider all material information
reasonably available’ in making business decisions.”  Consequently,118
courts frequently state that directors breach the duty of care by failing “to
act in an informed and deliberate manner” when making a decision on
behalf of the corporation.  One court has indicated that directors may119
breach the duty of care by failing to review financial statements or to have
a rudimentary understanding of corporate affairs.  Similarly, when a120
director approves a transaction without determining whether the value
given by the corporation equals or exceeds the value received, the director
may breach the duty of care.  Some courts have endorsed a stronger121
formulation of the duty of care, stating that a board’s decision will be
upheld unless the decision cannot be “‘attributed to any rational business
purpose.’”  Thus, these courts indicate that the business judgment rule122
does not protect irrational decisions.123
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business judgment rule.” (footnote omitted)); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.,
519 A.2d 103, 111 n.9 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“[A] decision by disinterested directors following a
deliberative process may still be the basis for liability if such decision cannot be ‘attributed to any
rational business purpose,’ or is ‘egregious.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Sinclair, 280 A.2d at
720)).
124. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874–88.
125. Disney II, 746 A.2d at 262–64 (holding that the business judgment rule requires “process
due care”); Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 92 (“Van Gorkom thus established a requirement of what
might be called procedural or process due care as a prerequisite for invoking the business judgment
rule.”).
126. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1790 (2001).
127. This time-oriented analysis began in Van Gorkom, where the court noted that the board
reached its decision after only two hours of deliberation based on a twenty-minute oral presentation.
See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 868–69; see, e.g., Kumar v. Racing Corp. of Am., Civ. A. No. 12039,
1991 WL 67083, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 26, 1991) (finding that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail
on a duty-of-care claim because the board meeting was “short, almost to the point of being
perfunctory,” no documents were distributed, no financial analysis was presented, and only a brief
discussion occurred before the vote). 
128. Branson, supra note 46, at 639–40 (“The business judgment rule’s emphasis on the
process leading to formal judgments also constitutes make-work for lawyers who, as process
engineers, come to have a larger role than they should have in the board room. Similarly, critics of
the modern business judgment rule say that insistence on formal decisions places a premium on
play acting and on paper trails. It does not improve the quality of decisions that are made.”).
129. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney V), 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005),
aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
In analyzing an alleged breach of the duty of care, however, the
Delaware courts interpret the standard of conduct to require only
procedural due care.  By focusing on procedural due care, courts review124
the process that the board used to reach the decision and not the merits of
the decision.  The focus on procedure has a profound effect on litigation125
because courts “insulate directors from liability whenever [directors] make
even a modest attempt to follow the appropriate formalities.”  Indeed,126
some courts have interpreted this emphasis on process as requiring an
analysis of the time a board devoted to discussing a particular decision as
if there exists some talismanic number of minutes.  Boards of directors,127
taking note of the focus on process, can document their decision-making
processes with thorough board minutes that reflect careful and deliberative
procedures. Skeptics, however, argue that focusing on process leads
merely to “play acting and . . . paper trails” but “does not improve the
quality of decisions that are made.”128
The Delaware courts further reduced the standard of conduct by stating
that “deficiencies in the directors’ process are actionable only if the
directors’ actions are grossly negligent.”  Gross negligence in this129
context has been defined as a “‘reckless indifference to or a deliberate
disregard of the whole body of stockholders’ or actions which are ‘without
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130. Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., Civ. A. No. 7961, 1990 WL 42607, at *12 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 5, 1990) (quoting Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 147 A. 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929)).
131. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(footnote omitted).
132. See Disney V, 907 A.2d at 750 (“[D]uty of care violations are rarely found.”); see also
Fairfax, supra note 8, at 407–08 (“Over the last twenty years, a variety of mechanisms have
contributed to a virtual elimination of legal liability for directors who breach their duty of care
under state law.”); Loewenstein, supra note 26, at 369 (“Van Gorkom is famous, of course, because
it marked one of the few times that a court found directors liable for breach of the duty of care.”);
cf. Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and
Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 591 nn.1–2 (1983) (noting
only seven cases holding directors liable for all breaches of fiduciary duty (other than in the context
of self-interested transactions)).
133. Disney V, 907 A.2d at 749 (quoting In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967).
134. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.) (Disney VI), 906 A.2d 27,
the bounds of reason.’”130
[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the
fact, believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of
wrong extending through “stupid” to “egregious” or
“irrational”, provides no ground for director liability, so long
as the court determines that the process employed was either
rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance
corporate interests. To employ a different rule—one that
permitted an “objective” evaluation of the decision—would
expose directors to substantive second guessing by ill-
equipped judges or juries, which would, in the long-run, be
injurious to investor interests. Thus, the business judgment
rule is process oriented and informed by a deep respect for all
good faith board decisions. 
. . . Where a director in fact exercises a good faith effort
to be informed and to exercise appropriate judgment, he or
she should be deemed to satisfy fully the duty of attention.131
Combining the focus on procedural due care with the gross negligence
standard has an easily identifiable effect—courts almost never impose
financial liability on directors for breaching the duty of care.132
Disney highlights the disparity between the Delaware courts’ stated
standard of conduct for the duty of care and the lower standard of liability
with respect to breaches of the duty of care. In Disney, the Delaware
Chancery Court stated that liability for a loss may flow from an “‘ill
advised or negligent’” decision, or “‘from an unconsidered failure of the
board to act in circumstances in which due attention would, arguably,
have prevented the loss.’”  Analyzing the facts, the Delaware Chancery133
Court and the Delaware Supreme Court stated that Disney’s directors did
not comply with corporate best practices.  As to Ovitz’s no-cause134
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55–56 (Del. 2006); Disney V, 907 A.2d at 697.
135. Disney V, 907 A.2d at 736. 
136. See id. at 697; see also Disney VI, 906 A.2d at 60.
137. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
138. See id. at 893; see also Loewenstein, supra note 26, at 369.
139. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 865–67.
140. Id. at 867–68.
141. Id. at 868.
142. Id. at 874.
143. Id. at 869.
144. Id. at 893; id. at 874 (“The directors (1) did not adequately inform themselves as to Van
Gorkom’s role in forcing the ‘sale’ of the Company and in establishing the per share purchase price;
(2) were uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the Company; and (3) given these circumstances,
at a minimum, were grossly negligent in approving the ‘sale’ of the Company upon two hours’
consideration, without prior notice, and without the exigency of a crisis or emergency.”).
145. Id. at 876–79. But see id. at 894–96 (McNeilly, J., dissenting) (noting the directors’
termination, which resulted in a $140 million payout to Ovitz, the
Delaware Chancery Court stated the following:
Thus, as of December 12, Ovitz was officially terminated
without cause. Up to this point, however, the Disney board
had never met in order to vote on, or even discuss, the
termination at a full session, and few if any directors did an
independent investigation of whether Ovitz could be
terminated for cause. As a result, the Disney directors had
been taken for a wild ride, and most of it was in the dark.135
However, despite concluding that Disney’s directors had neither fulfilled
the standard of conduct nor followed best practices, the courts held that the
directors had not breached the duty of care and thus imposed no legal
liability on the directors.136
The facts of Disney strongly resemble those of Smith v. Van Gorkom,137
which is virtually the only Delaware opinion holding directors liable for
breaching their duty of care.  Van Gorkom, the CEO of Trans Union,138
approached Jay Pritzker and offered to sell Trans Union at $55 per share
when the market price was about $38 per share.  Pritzker accepted139
subject to certain conditions, which included limiting Trans Union’s
freedom to shop around for a better offer.  Van Gorkom presented the140
deal to Trans Union’s board in a twenty-minute oral presentation.  The141
board did not receive a written summary of the proposed merger
agreement, studies, or any other documents.  After deliberating for only142
two hours, the board voted to approve the offer.  The Delaware Supreme143
Court ultimately held that the directors violated their duty of care by
failing to adequately investigate the offer  because they had not valued144
the company, sought expert advice, or solicited other offers.  In Van145
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sophistication, their thorough knowledge of the company, the premium over market price, and an
investment banking firm’s failure to find another buyer).
146. Id. at 872 (majority opinion).
147. Id.
148. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1166 n.18 (Del. 1995) (noting that
§ 102(b)(7) was enacted in response to Van Gorkom); Loewenstein, supra note 26, at 369 (“[Van
Gorkom] motivated the Delaware legislature (at the prompting of the corporate law committee of
the Delaware bar) to enact legislation that allowed Delaware corporations to exempt directors from
monetary damages for breaches of the duty of care.”); Veasey, supra note 1, at 447 (noting that Van
Gorkom led to the enactment of § 102(b)(7)).
149. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2008).
150. Fairfax, supra note 8, at 412 (citing J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State
Corporate Law in the Governance of Public Companies, 38 U.RICH.L.REV. 317, 332 n.93 (2004)).
151. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001); Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d
1075, 1095–96 (Del. 2001). In addition, as Professor Fairfax has noted, “The combination of
indemnification provisions and [directors’ and officers’] insurance essentially eliminates directors’
financial liability for breaching their fiduciary obligations.” Fairfax, supra note 8, at 414.
152. Future research should explore the continuing advisability of exculpatory statutes for both
public and private corporations.
153. See, e.g., Christine Hurt, More Disney: Where Did That Van Gorkom Case Go?,
CONGLOMERATE BLOG: BUS. L. ECON. & SOC’Y, June 9, 2006, http://www.theconglomerate.org/
2006/06/more_disney_whe.html (“I searched the opinion—no ‘Van Gorkom.’ There’s not even a
‘Gorkom.’ So, the Supreme Court of Delaware issues an opinion in an appeal that has everyone
asking ‘Is Van Gorkom’ Dead?’ and does not even cite Van Gorkom?”) (formatting added).
Gorkom, the court stated that the business judgment rule does not protect
an uninformed decision.  Further, the court concluded that directors may146
be held liable for breaching their duty of care if the plaintiff shows that the
directors were grossly negligent in failing to inform themselves of all
material information reasonably available to them.147
The Delaware Legislature acted quickly to lessen Van Gorkom’s
impact by enacting § 102(b)(7),  which permits corporations to limit or148
eliminate director liability for breaches of the duty of care (but not for
breaches of loyalty or good faith).  All states currently have statutes149
allowing corporations to limit or eliminate personal liability for directors
for duty-of-care breaches.  These statutes insulate directors from150
financial liability for breaching their duty of care and also allow directors
to obtain dismissal of lawsuits in which a plaintiff alleges only a duty-of-
care violation.  Although these statutes effectively limit the impact of the151
duty of care,  it still has relevance for (1) those corporations that have not152
adopted such provisions, (2) those plaintiffs seeking only injunctive relief
for an alleged duty-of-care breach, and (3) those plaintiffs alleging a
breach of the duty of care along with breaches of other fiduciary duties.
Many commentators believed that the Disney case presented an
opportunity for the Delaware Supreme Court to address Van Gorkom’s
continued validity.  The Delaware Supreme Court, however, did not even153
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154. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.) (Disney VI), 906 A.2d 27 (Del.
2006).
155. See, e.g., Larry Ribstein, The Disney Affirmance: The End of the SOX Era?, IDEOBLOG,
June 8, 2006, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/06/the_disney_affi.html (“Van Gorkom
is still dead. Of course there’s still gross negligence liability, but not a la Van Gorkom.”).
156. See Steve Bainbridge, Is Van Gorkom Dead, CONGLOMERATE BLOG: BUS. L. ECON. &
SOC’Y, Aug. 11, 2005, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2005/08/is_van_gorkom_d.html
(responding to the Delaware Chancery Court’s opinion and disagreeing with the proposition that
Van Gorkom is dead); Hurt, supra note 153 (discussing why the Delaware Supreme Court did not
expressly reject Van Gorkom); Larry Ribstein, Is Van Gorkom Dead?, CONGLOMERATE BLOG:BUS.
L. ECON. & SOC’Y, Aug. 11, 2005, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2005/08/
is_van_gorkom_d_1.html (“So does Van Gorkom have any kind of a pulse? Maybe, in the
following limited sense: No case ever dies in Delaware. Often cases are preserved as alternative
tools the court can draw from as the facts and times require. At worst, cases go into suspended
animation, to be dug up for freakish facts when none of the cases in current ‘inventory’ are
useful.”).
157. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
158. See Cede, 634 A.2d at 362; see also Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 22 (Del. Ch. 2002)
(stating that the business judgment rule is rebutted where a majority of the directors either were
“interested in the outcome of the transaction or lacked the independence to consider objectively
whether the transaction was in the best interest of its company and all of its shareholders”).
159. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). 
cite Van Gorkom in the Disney opinion.  It remains to be seen whether154
Disney signals the death of Van Gorkom  or whether Van Gorkom may155
be resurrected in future cases.  Until the Delaware Supreme Court settles156
the debate, Van Gorkom remains a thread on which plaintiffs’ attorneys
can cling in alleging breaches of the duty of care and in defending against
defendants’ pretrial assertions of the business judgment rule. Even Disney,
in which the directors ultimately avoided liability, presents such threads
in its broad language regarding best practices and the standard of conduct
for the duty of care.
B.  The Duty of Loyalty
Like with the duty of care, courts broadly state the standard of conduct
for the duty of loyalty but then apply a much lower standard of liability to
alleged breaches of that duty. The duty of loyalty “mandates that the best
interest of the corporation and its shareholders takes precedence over any
interest possessed by a director, officer or controlling shareholder and not
shared by the stockholders generally.”  Specifically, a director must157
exercise independent judgment, and the director must be disinterested in
the outcome.  The Delaware Chancery Court in Disney described the158
duty of loyalty by quoting from a seminal case, Guth v. Loft, Inc. :159
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160. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney V), 907 A.2d 693, 751 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(alteration in original) (quoting Guth, 5 A.2d at 510), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
161. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993).
162. Id.
163. Cede, 634 A.2d at 362.
164. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, §§ 7.1–7.2, at 306–07, §§ 7.2–7.3, at 321–23.
165. Cede, 634 A.2d at 362; see also Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 264 (Del.
2002) (“Directors must not only be independent, but must act independently.”); Rales, 634 A.2d
at 935 (“[T]he board must be able to act free of personal financial interest and improper extraneous
influences.”).
166. Telxon, 802 A.2d at 264.
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their
position of trust and confidence to further their private
interests. . . . A public policy, existing through the years, and
derived from a profound knowledge of human characteristics
and motives, has established a rule that demands of a
corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the
most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only
affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation
committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing
anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to
deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability
might properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the
reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers. The rule that
requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation
demands that there be no conflict between duty and self-
interest.160
A director is “interested” in the outcome of a decision where the
director “will receive a personal financial benefit from [the] transaction
that is not equally shared by the stockholders.”  A director is also161
“interested” where the “corporate decision will have a materially
detrimental impact on a director, but not on the corporation and the
stockholders.”  The benefit need not be financial; directors are162
“interested” where they “receive[] a substantial benefit from supporting a
transaction.”  Examples of self-interested breaches of the duty of loyalty163
include self-dealing, excessive compensation, use of corporate funds to
perpetuate control, insider trading, usurping corporate opportunities, and
competition by corporate officers and directors with their corporation.164
Independence, on the other hand, requires that “the director’s decision
is based entirely on the corporate merits of the transaction and is not
influenced by personal or extraneous considerations.”  The current165
common-law definition of “independence” focuses on familial or close
personal relationships.  In other words, if a director’s son stands on the166
other side of a proposed contract with the corporation, courts assume that
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167. Id.; see also Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d
1040, 1050 (Del. 2004); Rales, 634 A.2d at 936.
168. Telxon, 802 A.2d at 264; see also Cede, 634 A.2d at 362 (“[A] director who receives a
substantial benefit from supporting a transaction cannot be objectively viewed as disinterested or
independent.”).
169. Branson, supra note 46, at 642 (“A plaintiff making [a dominated director case] faces an
uphill battle. Courts are loathe to find that an otherwise reputable business person is not his or her
own person.”).
170. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1052.
171. Cf. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committees, and the
Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305, 1307–15 (2005) (noting that almost all
courts reject the notion of inevitable structural bias, which theorizes that due to business, social,
and other relationships, directors cannot independently serve on an SLC).
172. The independence of directors may also be affected by the high salaries that some
corporations pay their directors because the salaries may silence any dissent. SKEEL, supra note 7,
director cannot act independently. Plaintiffs may also show lack of
independence by proving that a director is “controlled” by or “beholden”
to the interested directors, or so influenced by the interested directors that
the “independent” director’s discretion would be compromised.  A167
director is “controlled” or “beholden” when the controlling party has the
direct or indirect unilateral power to decide whether the
director continues to receive a benefit upon which the director
is so dependent or is of such subjective material importance
that its threatened loss might create a reason to question
whether the director is able to consider the corporate merits
of the challenged transaction objectively.168
In analyzing alleged breaches of the duty of loyalty, however, the
Delaware courts interpret the standard of liability more narrowly. For
instance, courts rarely find that a director is controlled by another.  As169
one court stated:
To create a reasonable doubt about an outside director’s
independence, a plaintiff must plead facts that would support
the inference that because of the nature of a relationship or
additional circumstances other than the interested director’s
stock ownership or voting power, the non-interested director
would be more willing to risk his or her reputation than risk
the relationship with the interested director.170
Further, courts never find non-familial relationships alone to be bias
producing.  The recent corporate scandals, however, suggest that171
independence may be threatened by more than familial relationships.172
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at 165. Directors may also be silenced by a charismatic CEO. Id.
173. Id. at 164 (“Cronyism may have been part of the reason that WorldCom’s board let
Bernie Ebbers do whatever he wanted. The inner circle on the board consisted of the managerial
directors . . . and several of Bernie’s childhood friends. . . . [T]he Enron directors don’t look quite
so robustly independent. Several of the directors had direct financial ties to Enron . . . . [and] others
worked for non-profits . . . that received six-figure donations from Enron during their tenures on
the board. It doesn’t take a conspiracy theorist to suspect that directors with these kinds of ties
might be reluctant to ask hard questions about the company that has been so kind to their
institution.”).
174. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1050; Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 980–81
(Del. Ch. 2000) (finding an allegation that a director was controlled by another director because of
their fifteen-year professional and personal relationship was insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt
as to independence); Benerofe v. Cha, No. 14614, 1998 WL 83081, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 1998)
(finding that conclusory allegations of long-standing friendship do not raise a reasonable doubt
about whether a director could exercise independent business judgment); In re Grace Energy Corp.
S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 12,464, 1992 WL 145001, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 26, 1992) (“[T]he
Delaware Supreme Court has made it clear that conclusory allegations of such personal affinity
alone are not sufficient to establish director interest. Actual financial interest must be shown.”).
175. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1051 (analyzing the directors’ independence and the business
judgment rule’s applicability to decide whether demand was excused).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Davis, supra note 171, at 1307–15.
179. Branson, supra note 46, at 641–42.
Although the directors at Enron and WorldCom would likely be
considered independent under the traditional common-law definitions, the
directors’ relationships, such as close friendships or business relationships,
suggested a lack of true independence.173
Courts, however, state that “[a]llegations of mere personal friendship
or a mere outside business relationship, standing alone, are insufficient to
raise a reasonable doubt about a director’s independence.”  For example,174
in Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart,
allegations that Martha Stewart and other directors “moved in the same
social circles, attended the same weddings, developed business
relationships before joining the board, and described each other as
‘friends,’ even when coupled with Stewart’s 94% voting power, [were]
insufficient, without more, to rebut the presumption of independence.”175
In fact, the court stated that “[w]hether they arise before board
membership or later as a result of collegial relationships among the board
of directors, such affinities—standing alone—will not” rebut the
presumption of independence.  Such allegations also did “not provide a176
sufficient basis from which reasonably to infer” that other directors were
beholden to Stewart.177
Courts also do not view structural bias as actionable.  Structural bias178
is defined as “the predilection of directors to favor those of the same social
or economic class, such as fellow directors or senior managers.”  The179
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180. See supra Part II.A (discussing SLCs).
181. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).
182. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (Supp. IV 2004); NYSE, Inc.,
Listed Company Manual § 303A.02 (2004) (stating that a director is not independent if, among
other things, the director has a material relationship with the listed company, has been an employee
of the listed company within the last three years, or has an immediate family member who has been
an executive officer of the listed company within the last three years); NASDAQ, Inc., Marketplace
Rules R. 4200(a)(15) (2004) (similar definitions). 
183. See Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 264–65 (Del. 2002) (noting the current
common-law definition of “independence” and its requirements). 
184. See SKEEL, supra note 7, at 183 (“Most large corporations already have a majority of
disinterested directors on their boards. The Business Roundtable, a group of executives from the
nation’s leading companies, has been promoting this strategy since 1990, and institutional investors
such as [the California Public Employees’ Retirement System] have made disinterestedness a major
focus of their corporate-governance initiatives.”).
185. Id. at 184.
186. See Arsht, supra note 52, at 99.
187. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Hodges v. New Eng. Screw Co., 3 R.I. 9, 18 (1853)).
structural-bias argument is most compelling in the SLC context, where the
directors on the SLC recommend that a derivative suit not continue against
fellow directors.  The typical motivation behind such a recommendation180
has been referred to as “‘there but for the grace of God go I’ empathy.”181
Sarbanes–Oxley and the requirements adopted by the NYSE and
NASDAQ define when directors are not independent and disinterested.182
These new definitions, however, follow the narrow standards of liability
set by the Delaware courts.  Moreover, these definitions will not affect183
the performance of most boards because most large corporations’ boards
already consist of a majority of independent directors even according to
the new definitions.  For example, “[a]ll but two of Enron’s directors184
were disinterested, and Enron had disinterested audit and compensation
committees, yet the directors simply nodded their heads as [Ken] Lay and
Jeff Skilling spun their web of magnificent promises and prophecies.”185
Consequently, the same standard of liability for duty-of-loyalty breaches
applies under both Delaware common law and these regulatory definitions.
C.  The Duty of Good Faith
The duty of good faith is perhaps the most elusive of the fiduciary
duties. Although the term “good faith” appears in early business judgment
rule cases, it rarely served as a basis of decision.  An early judicial186
explanation of the business judgment rule stated that “‘a Board of
Directors acting in good faith and with reasonable care and diligence, who
nevertheless fall into a mistake, either as to law or fact, are not liable for
the consequences of such mistake.’”  Other courts define the business187
judgment rule in relation to “bad faith”: “‘In the absence of a showing of
bad faith on the part of the directors or of a gross abuse of discretion the
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188. Id. at 108 (emphasis added) (quoting Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492–93 (Del.
1966)).
189. Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 483–84 (2004)
(alteration in original) (quoting Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1053 (Del. Ch.
1996)).
190. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.) (Disney VI), 906 A.2d 27, 52
(Del. 2006); Veasey, supra note 1, at 447 (“[I]t seems that there is a separate duty of good faith,
not only arising out of our case law, but also as a matter of statutory construction.”).
191. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney V), 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(footnotes omitted), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
192. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney III), 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003).
193. Disney VI, 906 A.2d at 63.
194. Id. at 63–64; see also Croton River Club, Inc. v. Half Moon Bay Homeowners Ass’n (In
re Croton River Club, Inc.), 52 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he business judgment rule does not
business judgment of directors will not be interfered with by the
courts.’”  Courts also refer to good faith when explaining the duties of188
loyalty and care. For instance, one formulation of the duty of loyalty states
that independent and disinterested directors will not be “liable for a breach
of that duty, unless the facts of the transaction are ‘such that no person
could possibly authorize [it] if he or she were attempting in good faith to
meet their duty.’”189
The Delaware Supreme Court’s recent Disney opinion suggested that
good faith constituted a separate fiduciary duty,  although the court190
explained the duty of good faith by referring to incidents of “bad faith.” As
the Delaware Chancery Court in Disney stated: 
Upon long and careful consideration, I am of the opinion that
the concept of intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious
disregard for one’s responsibilities, is an appropriate
(although not the only) standard for determining whether
fiduciaries have acted in good faith. Deliberate indifference
and inaction in the face of a duty to act is, in my mind,
conduct that is clearly disloyal to the corporation. It is the
epitome of faithless conduct.191
In a previous opinion in the Disney litigation, the Chancery Court stated
that directors act in bad faith if they “consciously and intentionally
disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t care about the
risks’ attitude concerning a material corporate decision.”192
The Delaware Supreme Court accepted the Chancery Court’s
definitions of “bad faith.”  Recognizing that the duty of good faith is a193
relatively undeveloped concept in corporate law yet an increasingly
important one, the Delaware Supreme Court also gave “some conceptual
guidance to the corporate community” on the meaning of the duty of good
faith.  The court identified two categories of fiduciary behavior that fit194
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protect actions taken in bad faith . . . .”); W. Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co. (In re J.P.
Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig.), 542 A.2d 770, 780–81 (Del. Ch. 1988) (stating that bad faith may
be inferred where the board’s decision “is so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that
it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith”).
195. Disney VI, 906 A.2d at 64.
196. Id. at 66.
197. Id. at 66–67.
198. Id. at 64–66. 
199. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. 2006).
200. Id. at 364. AmSouth Bancorporation and AmSouth Bank paid millions of dollars in fines
and civil penalties to resolve government investigations relating to the bank’s failure to file
Suspicious Activity Reports on the transactions produced by an unlawful “Ponzi” scheme, as
required by the federal Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money-laundering regulations. Id. at 365–66.
201. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
202. Id. at 971.
the “bad faith” label. “The first category involves so-called ‘subjective bad
faith,’ that is, fiduciary conduct motivated by an actual intent to do
harm.”  The Chancery Court’s definition, which involves “intentional195
dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities,”
captures the second category.  The Delaware Supreme Court stated that196
this category proscribes fiduciary conduct that does not involve disloyalty
yet rises above gross negligence.  The court rejected the plaintiffs’197
argument that conduct resulting from gross negligence violates the duty of
good faith as well as the duty of care.  Based on these definitions of bad198
faith, both the Delaware Chancery Court and the Delaware Supreme Court
held that Disney’s directors did not breach their fiduciary duty of good
faith.
About a year after Disney, the Delaware Supreme Court revisited the
duty of good faith in Stone v. Ritter, which involved an evaluation of
whether demand was excused in a shareholder derivative case.  The199
shareholder-plaintiffs alleged that the directors of AmSouth
Bancorporation had failed to ensure that a reasonable compliance and
reporting system existed for the corporation and its wholly owned
subsidiary, AmSouth Bank.  This is known as a director oversight claim200
or a Caremark claim, from In re Caremark International Derivative
Litigation.  In Caremark, the court stated that 201
where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss is
predicated upon ignorance of liability creating activities
within the corporation . . . only a sustained or systematic
failure of the board to exercise oversight . . . will establish the
lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.202
In Stone, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that such a claim touches
the second category of bad faith conduct identified in Disney—an
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203. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369.
204. Id. at 370.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 369–70 (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
207. Id. at 370.
208. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984) (noting that the business judgment rule
does not apply “where directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious
decision, failed to act”), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner (Disney II), 746 A.2d 244
(Del. 2000); Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971); Bainbridge, supra note
intentional dereliction of duty or a conscious disregard for one’s
duties—and declared that this category of bad faith conduct “is fully
consistent with” the lack of good faith conduct that Caremark held was
necessary for director oversight liability.  The court held that “a showing203
of bad faith conduct . . . is essential to establish director oversight liability”
but that “the fiduciary duty violated by that conduct is the duty of
loyalty.”  Thus, the duty of loyalty “encompasses cases where the204
fiduciary fails to act in good faith.”  Consistent with this interpretation,205
the Delaware Supreme Court stated that “a failure to act in good faith is
not conduct that results, ipso facto, in the direct imposition of fiduciary
liability” but that a “failure to act in good faith may result in liability
because the requirement to act in good faith ‘is a subsidiary
element’ . . . ‘of the fundamental duty of loyalty.’”  Interestingly, the206
court then made the broad statement that the duty of “good faith does not
establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as
the duties of care and loyalty.”207
Exactly how the Delaware courts will analyze alleged breaches of the
duty of good faith remains to be seen. The Stone opinion strongly suggests
that the Delaware Supreme Court is seeking to further narrow the limited
duty of good faith recognized in its Disney opinion and that it will refuse
to recognize an independent duty of good faith when directly confronted
with such a claim. Both opinions indicate that the Delaware Supreme
Court foresees a limited role for the duty of good faith and that good faith
will likely impact only the handful of cases that satisfy the narrow
categories of “bad faith” identified by the court.
D.  The Categories to Which the Business Judgment Rule
                       Does Not Apply                   
Plaintiffs also may rebut the business judgment rule presumption by
showing that the directors failed to make a decision or that the directors’
conduct was fraudulent, illegal, or wasteful. It is axiomatic that the
business judgment rule applies only to scenarios involving a “business
judgment.” Thus, the board must actually make a decision to invoke the
business judgment rule.  The board can decide to act or not to act, but the208
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40, at 99 (“It is well established, for example, that directors may only invoke the business judgment
rule when they have made a conscious decision.”).
209. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 (“[A] conscious decision to refrain from acting may . . . be a
valid exercise of business judgment and enjoy the protections of the rule.”); Rabkin v. Philip A.
Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 1172 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“The business judgment rule may apply
to a deliberate decision not to act . . . .”).
210. Paglin v. Saztec Int’l, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1184, 1200 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (“[T]he business
judgment rule does not apply when the act complained of is ultra vires, illegal, or fraudulent.”);
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (“‘The directors are chosen to pass
upon [questions of policy and business management] and their judgment unless shown to be tainted
with fraud is accepted as final.’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co.,
142 A. 654, 659 (Del. Ch. 1928))); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810–11 (Sup.
Ct. 1976) (stating that courts will not substitute their judgment for that of directors absent “fraud,
dishonesty, or nonfeasance”); Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 365 (N.Y. 1888) (“[C]ourts will not
interfere unless the [directors’] powers have been illegally or unconscientiously executed; or unless
it be made to appear that the acts were fraudulent or collusive, and destructive of the rights of the
stockholders.”). 
211. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.) (Disney VI) 906 A.2d 27,
73–74 (Del. 2006) (“This claim is rooted in the doctrine that a plaintiff who fails to rebut the
business judgment rule presumptions is not entitled to any remedy unless the transaction constitutes
waste.” (citing W. Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co. (In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders
Litig.), 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988))); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 335–36 (Del. Ch.
1997) (noting that the business judgment rule does not apply to acts of waste).
212. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 336.
213. Id.
214. Id.
board must have made a conscious decision.209
Courts have held that the business judgment rule does not apply to
board decisions involving fraud or illegality.  Fraud and illegality are210
excluded from the defense because the board does not have authority to
violate the law.
The business judgment rule also does not protect board decisions that
waste corporate assets.  Yet because a board does not violate the law by211
wasting corporate assets the reason that the rule does not apply to waste is
more difficult to articulate. “[W]aste entails an exchange of corporate
assets for consideration so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the
range at which any reasonable person might be willing to trade.”  For212
example, “a transfer of corporate assets, that serves no corporate purpose”
might constitute waste.  Similarly, a transfer of corporate assets might213
constitute waste if no “consideration at all is received.”  In Disney, the214
Delaware Supreme Court defined waste and the plaintiff’s burden to show
waste as follows:
To recover on a claim of corporate waste, the plaintiffs must
shoulder the burden of proving that the exchange was “so one
sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment
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215. Disney VI, 906 A.2d at 74 (footnote omitted) (quoting Brehm v. Eisner (Disney II), 746
A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000)).
216. Id.
could conclude that the corporation has received adequate
consideration.” A claim of waste will arise only in the rare,
“unconscionable case where directors irrationally squander or
give away corporate assets.”215
Based on this definition of waste, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed
the Delaware Chancery Court’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ allegation of
waste even though Ovitz received a severance package of $140 million
after working for Disney for only fourteen months.216
V. CLARIFYING THE LIABILITY STANDARDS AND IMPROVING THE
HURDLES OF SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
As shown in Part III, the Delaware courts are applying new scrutiny to
directors’ assertions of the business judgment rule in pretrial motions and
allowing more cases to survive pretrial motions. With this new scrutiny,
the Delaware courts have effectively raised the requirements for directors
to prevail on pretrial assertions of the business judgment rule defense.
Moreover, the courts are necessarily giving less deference to directors’
decisions. Despite this new scrutiny, the Delaware courts have not
announced any new standard of review for the business judgment rule or
any new standards for its underlying fiduciary duties.
As Part IV explained, the Delaware courts’ decisions on the business
judgment rule have created a significant disparity between the standards
of conduct for directors’ fiduciary duties and the standards of liability for
alleged breaches of those duties. Based on this disparity, the Delaware
courts can deny pretrial motions asserting the business judgment rule
based on the standards of conduct, without referring to the much lower
standards of liability for breaches of the fiduciary duties. The Delaware
courts’ decisions inject unnecessary doctrinal chaos and unpredictability
into shareholder derivative litigation. This confusion and uncertainty has
potential negative consequences for shareholders, corporations, directors,
investors, and other litigants.
Following the Delaware courts’ lead, shareholder-plaintiffs and their
attorneys can draft complaints based upon the courts’ statements of the
strict fiduciary duties owed by directors and the courts’ descriptions of
conduct constituting best practices. Because Delaware case law contains
language supporting causes of actions based on these standards of conduct,
plaintiffs’ attorneys may advise potential clients, without running afoul of
ethical limitations, to pursue their claims under Delaware law. As a result,
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217. Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 101 (stating that a burden-shifting approach may
increase a plaintiff’s ability to survive a motion to dismiss and thus “the probability that more such
actions will be brought and the settlement value of such actions increase”).
218. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2008).
219. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 892 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing judicial scrutiny of an SLC’s
recommendation to dismiss and noting that a court may consider the “time spent by corporate
personnel preparing for and participating in the trial,” the “distraction of key personnel by
continued litigation,” and the “potential lost profits which may result from the publicity of a trial”);
see also Betsy Atkins, The Board in Crisis, in FIRST ANNUAL DIRECTORS’ INSTITUTE ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 899, 901–02 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No.
B0-021D, 2003), WL 1388 PLI/Corp 899 (“A negative news article or series of such articles could
lead to a ratings downgrade, increasing funding costs or even eliminating the ability to access
capital markets, which in turn could contribute to covenant defaults.”).
the number of derivative lawsuits may potentially increase as may the
number of meritless lawsuits.
Even if plaintiffs’ attorneys recognize the disconnect in Delaware law
between the broadly stated fiduciary duties and the narrow analyses of
alleged breaches of those duties in assessing the business judgment rule,
the attorneys may also recognize the likelihood that such cases will survive
pretrial motions given the recent trend in the Delaware courts. Thus,
plaintiffs’ attorneys may file derivative actions of questionable merit,
hoping to survive a pretrial motion and to persuade the corporation to
settle the action to avoid the expense of discovery and the risk of trial.
Similarly, now that Delaware courts apply new scrutiny to assertions of the
business judgment rule in pretrial motions (as shown in Part III), plaintiffs’
attorneys may either misjudge the likelihood that their cases ultimately
will succeed on the merits or overestimate the settlement value of their
cases. These potential miscalculations create the risk that plaintiffs will file
more shareholder derivative actions and that the settlement value of those
actions will increase.217
The confusion and uncertainty in Delaware law also leaves Delaware
corporations and their directors without guidance on how to act to receive
the protection of the business judgment rule at the earliest stages of future
litigation. Moreover, when Delaware courts increasingly allow derivative
actions to survive pretrial motions, more cases will progress through
discovery and trial, increasing attorneys’ fees and expenses. Ultimately the
corporation pays these expenses through insurance premiums or through
indemnification agreements that typically require the corporation to pay
the directors’ expenses, attorneys’ fees, judgments, fines, and settlement
amounts.  Protracted litigation may also cause the corporation to bear218
other costs, such as distracted employees and directors, as well as negative
publicity.219
This uncertainty potentially impacts directors’ decision-making
authority. Directors possess the statutory authority to govern the
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220. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008). 
221. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 559 (2003).
222. Id. at 572–73.
223. Fischel & Bradley, supra note 10, at 271 (“Shareholders with tiny investments can bring
derivative actions on behalf of a corporation.”).
224. Id. (noting that shareholders who are not plaintiffs “ultimately bear the costs” of
derivative actions); Jonathan R. Macey, Courts and Corporations: A Comment on Coffee, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1692, 1701 n.36 (1989) (“[N]onplaintiff-shareholders . . . bear the costs of the
litigation but enjoy only a fraction of the benefits . . . .”). Moreover, the shareholders bearing the
costs of a fiduciary-duty breach and subsequent derivative litigation are not necessarily the
shareholders benefiting when such litigation succeeds in recovering damages for the corporation.
Only those shareholders owning shares at the time of the breach through the time of final judgment
both bear the costs and enjoy the benefits of such litigation.
225. Fischel & Bradley, supra note 10, at 279 (noting that derivative actions based on public
policy, such as environmental concerns, will “undoubtedly decrease the wealth of the firm’s
equityholders”).
226. Stephen P. Ferris, Robert M. Lawless & Anil K. Makhija, Derivative Lawsuits as a
Corporate Governance Mechanism: Empirical Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding Filings
33 (Univ. of Mo. Contracting & Orgs. Research Inst., Working Paper No. 2001-03, 2001), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=495583.
corporations they serve.  By contrast, shareholders possess the right to220
approve certain actions proposed by directors (such as mergers) and have
few means to hold directors accountable for their decisions.  The limited221
power of shareholders aligns with the statutory grant of decision-making
authority to directors. If shareholders possessed more power to make
decisions or to hold directors accountable for their decisions, then
directors’ authority would decrease because some of the directors’
authority would be transferred to shareholders.  Likewise, if222
shareholders’ ability to file and maintain derivative actions has increased,
then directors’ decision-making authority likely has decreased. An
increased potential for derivative litigation may also lead directors to make
“safe” decisions that will not produce litigation. As a consequence,
directors might avoid taking calculated business risks that could increase
shareholder wealth. Thus, all shareholders would be harmed. 
A derivative action may also harm shareholders because all
shareholders of a corporation ultimately bear the litigation expenses.
While the shareholder-plaintiffs need to own only a minimal interest to
bring a derivative action on behalf of the corporation,  the costs accrue223
to all the corporation’s shareholders and not just the few shareholders who
brought the lawsuit.  Thus, the shareholders who are not plaintiffs224
involuntarily bear the expenses of an unwanted lawsuit. Further, the
litigation may reduce shareholder wealth because “[t]he litigation costs
imposed on the firm may well exceed the damages awarded even in
successful suits.”  Empirical evidence also suggests that filing a225
derivative action triggers “significant negative stock price reactions,”226
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227. See Fischel & Bradley, supra note 10, at 271–72 (“If the action appears to be a positive
net value project because of the possible recovery of attorneys’ fees, an attorney will pursue it
regardless of its effect on the value of the firm.” (footnote omitted)).
228. Id. at 280–82 (analyzing the impact of derivative actions on the wealth of the
corporation’s shareholders).
229. See id. at 279.
230. Jonathan Macey, Delaware: Home of the World’s Most Expensive Raincoat, 33 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1131, 1132 (2005) (“The Delaware judiciary has created an environment in which lawsuits
are plentiful, legal fees are high, and attorneys’ fees generously awarded, but where directors, in
the end, are protected from liability by the slow and steady hand of the Delaware judiciary.”).
231. Id. at 1131.
232. Richard Verrier, Ruling on Ovitz’s Severance Is Upheld; Delaware’s High Court Finds
that Disney’s Board Did Not Betray Its Duty to Investors, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2006, at C1 (quoting
Steven Schulman).
233. See Veasey, supra note 1, at 442 (“In the wake of Enron, Worldcom and other debacles,
markets plunged, innocent people lost significant values in their retirement accounts, and investor
confidence plummeted.”).
which damage all shareholders.
Attorneys are the only clear winners from the confusion and
unpredictability created by the Delaware courts. In fact, many plaintiffs’
attorneys may be motivated solely by the attorneys’ fees that derivative
litigation generates.  Thus, while derivative actions can serve as a227
“material check on managerial behavior,”  the incentives for plaintiffs’228
attorneys to bring such actions cannot be ignored.  Disney is an example229
of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ selfish incentives to bring derivative actions.230
After ten years of litigation, the shareholder-plaintiffs in Disney recovered
nothing for the corporation and the other shareholders.  The lead231
plaintiffs’ attorney in Disney, however, did not seem discouraged by the
loss: “‘We are disappointed that the court did not agree with our appeal,
but nonetheless we believe that we have vindicated important principles
of corporate governance.’”232
Further, if the confusion and unpredictability created by the Delaware
courts promote the filing of more derivative actions and allow more
actions to survive pretrial motions, then other litigants will suffer. The
time devoted by the Delaware courts to derivative litigation as a result of
their increased willingness to deny pretrial motions in such cases will
result in considerable delay in resolving other cases. In addition, other
state courts looking to Delaware corporate law lack guidance in evaluating
the business judgment rule for the entities incorporated in these states.
Finally, the Delaware courts’ recent decisions also risk undermining
shareholder confidence in corporate stocks, just as the recent corporate
scandals did.  Increased shareholder derivative suits could cause233
investors to lose confidence in director-managed corporations and lead
investors not to invest in the stock market. Increased derivative litigation
may also make directors more wary, leading them to vote for the “safe”
course of action in an attempt to avoid litigation. If directors opt not to
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234. See Macey, supra note 230, at 1137 (“Moreover, there is the tone of the opinion, in which
the directors are repeatedly chastised for failing to live up to best practices as they apply to
corporate governance issues. It will be worth a lot of professional fees to directors to avoid being
pilloried the way that the directors and top officers of Disney were pilloried in this opinion.”).
235. Id.
236. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 401
(concise 9th ed. 2005) (“A standard of conduct states how an actor should conduct a given activity
or play a given role.” (emphasis omitted)).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 401–02.
take calculated business risks, corporate returns for shareholders could
decline and again negatively affect investment in corporate stocks.
Although the Delaware courts ultimately found that the Disney
defendants did not breach any fiduciary duty and that the business
judgment rule protected their decisions, the opinions from the Delaware
courts in Disney, and other recent cases, contain language that gives hope
to future litigants and may even encourage lawyers to bring more
derivative suits. In addition, by repeatedly reprimanding directors for
failing to meet best practices in corporate governance, the Disney litigation
might make directors more likely to seek legal advice to protect
themselves from being castigated like the Disney directors.  As one234
commentator noted, the Delaware Chancery Court’s opinion in Disney “is
noteworthy because it manages to side with the defendants while
simultaneously giving them significant incentives to cloak their decisions
in a dense shroud of process and to take other steps that will generate high
fees for lawyers, investment bankers, and other advisers.”235
A common-law doctrine that best serves to create fees for attorneys and
other corporate consultants is a doctrine in desperate need of an overhaul.
Two primary improvements should be implemented by either the courts
or the legislature. First, clear standards of legal liability must be stated.
Second, procedural requirements for shareholder derivative actions should
be implemented to deter meritless lawsuits and to assess the business
judgment rule early in litigation.
A.  Implementing Clear Standards of Legal Liability
The fiduciary duties constitute standards of conduct that guide directors
in carrying out their roles.  The business judgment rule, on the other236
hand, “states the test a court should apply when it reviews [directors’]
conduct to determine whether to impose liability.”  As explained in Part237
IV, current Delaware case law broadly defines corporate standards of
conduct for directors, while imposing much lower standards of liability
when assessing alleged breaches of directors’ fiduciary duties.  Unlike238
many areas of law where the standard of conduct and the standard of
liability are the same, in corporate law these standards diverge, and the
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239. See id. at 401.
240. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., supra note 182, § 303A (providing the NYSE Corporate
Governance Rules); BUS. ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2005),
available at http://www.businessroundtable.org/pdf/CorporateGovPrinciples.pdf; CAL. PUB.
EMPLOYEES’ RET. SYS., CORE PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2007),
available at http://www.calpers-governance.org/principles/domestic/us/downloads/us-corpgov-
principles.pdf.
Delaware courts have exploited this divergence in recent opinions as
demonstrated in Part III.  To counter this disconnect in Delaware law, the239
standards of liability and the standards of conduct should be aligned. This
result could be accomplished in two ways. The standards of liability could
be raised to match the current standards of conduct. Alternatively, the
current standards of conduct could simply be deleted.
If courts or legislatures make a normative determination that directors
must be held to the broadly stated fiduciary duties, then liability should be
based upon violations of those standards of conduct. Proponents of this
higher standard of liability may argue that the standard gives directors the
proper incentives to act in the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders. However, raising the standards of liability potentially
presents significant risks for shareholders because directors may avoid
taking justified business risks for fear of legal liability, which could
decrease the investment returns for shareholders. Similarly, the fear of
liability may dissuade individuals from becoming directors or continuing
as directors, which may also negatively impact corporate governance.
Holding directors to a higher standard of legal liability may also produce
more lawsuits. Thus, increasing the standard of legal liability will likely
harm, more than help, shareholders in the long run.
A better alternative recognizes the sufficiency of the current standards
of legal liability and eliminates any language regarding standards of
conduct or best practices. Critics of this approach may argue that directors
will not exercise the standards of conduct and best practices that
shareholders expect. However, legal liability cannot be imposed every
time hindsight makes clear that a board did not follow best practices. That
would be like holding Toyota liable for not making each of its vehicles to
the standards of its high-end Lexus vehicles. The concept of “best”
practices, by its very nature, constantly evolves, and both directors and
courts will struggle to compare actual corporate conduct to this ever-
changing concept. More importantly, the courts are neither the only, nor
arguably the best, institution to provide normative standards of conduct for
directors. In fact, the NYSE, corporate industry groups, and even
institutional investors already supply normative standards of conduct and
best practices.240
Furthermore, shareholders possess other methods for ensuring that
directors make decisions in the best interests of shareholders. If
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241. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2008); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.08–8.09
(2007). The true power of shareholders to nominate and elect directors is the subject of much
debate among scholars. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise,
93 VA. L. REV. 675, 677 (2007) (proposing corporate law amendments “to transform shareholder
power to remove directors from a myth into a reality,” such as “shareholder access to the corporate
ballot,” “reimbursement of expenses to challengers receiving a sufficiently significant number of
votes,” “shareholder power to replace all directors,” and “confidential voting and majority voting”);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601,
602–03 (2006) (arguing that efforts to expand the shareholder franchise are misguided).
242. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2008).
243. Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 122. But see Fairfax, supra note 8, at 429–30 (noting that
the market failed to regulate directors at Enron and WorldCom); id. at 448 (“[T]he market may
provide a strong incentive to corporate directors to publish overly optimistic news while ignoring
red flags and failing to scrutinize officer conduct.”).
244. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM.L.REV.
669, 718 (1986) (noting that directors’ fear of damaged reputations from shareholder derivative
litigation constrains their behavior). 
245. Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 125–26 (noting that a board of directors is an example
of a “relational team” and that such teams “are best monitored by a combination of mutual
motivation, peer pressure, and internal monitoring”).
shareholders of a public corporation believe that directors failed to use best
practices in making decisions, then those shareholders may readily sell
their shares. Further, after a breach of fiduciary duty is discovered,
shareholders may remove the errant director from office or decline to re-
elect the director at the next annual meeting.  Shareholders may also241
propose courses of action for the board of directors and thereby influence
directors’ decisions.  A variety of markets—including “capital and242
product markets, the internal and external employment markets, and the
market for corporate control”—hold directors accountable.  In addition,243
directors’ conduct may be constrained by their interest in maintaining their
reputations  and by their fellow directors.  Admittedly, these244 245
enforcement mechanisms do not provide a perfect solution to the agency
problem presented in corporations where management and ownership are
separate, and where necessary information may be unknown to
shareholders. And some of the mechanisms may not apply to closely held
corporations. Yet the severe costs to shareholders from imposing a higher
standard of legal liability are not ideal either. 
These proposals for reform will guide corporations and their directors
on how to conduct themselves to obtain the protection of the business
judgment rule and on how to do so early in litigation. More importantly,
a clear standard of liability allows shareholder-plaintiffs and their
attorneys to evaluate more accurately the likelihood of success for
derivative litigation and to know what they must prove to prevail on their
claims. Either the Delaware Supreme Court or the Delaware Legislature
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246. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for
Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225, 262–71 (2005).
247. For example, the American Law Institute (ALI) has codified a version of the business
judgment rule. The ALI’s version states:
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills the
duty [of care] . . . if the director or officer:
(1) is not interested . . . in the subject of the business judgment;
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the
extent the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the
circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interests of the
corporation.
1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 54, § 4.01(c). The main distinction between
the ALI approach and the Delaware presumption is that the ALI version places the burden on the
directors to establish the presence of the rule’s elements, and if the directors do so then they enter
a safe harbor. See Branson, supra note 46, at 635.
248. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
249. Costa, supra note 55, at 46 (noting that Delaware Chancery Court Judge Strine “has
warned against the ill effects of ‘bright line rules,’ which can lead to policies that are ‘too rigid and
punitive, and that cannot respond flexibly to future developments’”); id. at 47 (“When it comes to
corporation law, a significant common law component is inescapable: A statute can’t capture the
innovation and variety that defines business activity.”).
250. Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 128 (“[T]he business judgment rule clearly is misnamed;
it is a standard, not a rule.”); Branson, supra note 46, at 631 (noting that the business judgment rule
“has no mandatory content[,] . . . . involves no substantive ‘do’s’ or ‘don’ts’ for corporate directors
or officers,” and “entail[s] only slight review of business decisions”).
251. Compare Costa, supra note 55, at 46 (“[I]inconsistencies in the state’s corporate common
law can be a source of dynamism. They enable judges to update the law slowly and methodically
as new facts present themselves, taking account of innovations in business and new understandings
could implement the standards of liability.
The Delaware Supreme Court could wipe the slate clean and provide
clear standards of legal liability in a continuing evolution of the common
law. However, given that the Delaware Supreme Court created the existing
confusion and unpredictability, the court is unlikely to provide a global
clarification of the law. Such standards could more easily be codified by
the Delaware Legislature.  The legislature might enact such a statute if246
persuaded that the statute would protect corporate directors,  just as it247
was persuaded to enact § 102(b)(7) to mitigate Van Gorkom’s impact on
directors.248
Critics of a statutory response may argue that flexibility will be lost
because statutory law cannot respond to future changes in corporations.249
Although called a rule, the business judgment rule actually forms a
standard and not a rule.  Unlike a rule, a standard has flexibility. Thus,250
even if a statute provides the new standard,  the courts will apply that251
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about how incentives affect behavior.”), with id. at 47 (“In the hands of a wayward judge, poorly
articulated equitable principles or dramatic shifts in doctrine could also create confusing and ever-
changing legal guardrails. And since it’s the managers who choose where to incorporate, Delaware,
the leading venue, has an incentive to play to their interests at the expense of shareholders.”).
252. See Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 128 (“The greater flexibility inherent in standards
frequently comes into play in business judgment rule jurisprudence as courts fine tune the
doctrine’s application to the facts at bar.”).
253. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30–8.31 (2007) (codifying the fiduciary duties but not the
business judgment rule); id. § 8.30 official cmt. at 8-189 (“Section 8.30 does not try to codify the
business judgment rule or to delineate the differences between that defensive rule and the section’s
standards of director conduct. Section 8.30 deals only with standards of conduct—the level of
performance expected of every director . . . .”).
254. See Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 108.
255. Branson, supra note 46, at 640.
standard to the facts of each case and thereby will maintain the standard’s
flexibility.  Indeed, the Model Business Corporation Act, which252
enumerates standards of conduct and standards of liability for directors,
offers a partial statutory codification.  253
To state a clear standard for the business judgment rule, the methods
for rebutting that defense must also be defined with a litigation
perspective. Fraud, illegality, and waste already supply standards of
liability, but the fiduciary duties do not. Like the business judgment rule,
the fiduciary duties are standards, not rules. Although the fiduciary duties
can never be defined with absolute precision for every situation in every
corporation, the following subsections outline the parameters of the
standards of liability for the duties of care, loyalty, and good faith.
1.  The Duty of Care
A due-care analysis that allows a merit-based review presents an
obvious opportunity for shareholders and courts to second-guess directors’
decisions with the benefit of hindsight. Current common law allowing
courts to review directors’ decisions for “rationality” or “irrationality”
presents that risk because such a determination necessarily involves
reviewing the substance of the directors’ decision. No consistent
boundaries can be developed for reviewing the substance of directors’
decisions in litigation. In addition, if shareholders can second-guess
directors’ decisions through litigation, then the authority to manage the
corporation has shifted from directors to shareholders and courts.254
Further, allowing a substantive review of directors’ decisions almost
guarantees that courts will find that a factual question exists about whether
a director breached the duty of care. After finding a factual question, a
court cannot grant a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.
Reviewing the procedures that directors followed in making a
challenged decision, however, permits an objective method of review.255
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256. Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 105; accord Fairfax, supra note 8, at 399 (stating that
Enron’s directors “merely rubber-stamped management’s decisions”); see BAINBRIDGE, supra note
25, § 5.3, at 205–06 (discussing management-captured boards and the protections against them,
such as more focus on process and oversight).
257. Fairfax, supra note 8, at 399 (footnotes omitted); SKEEL, supra note 7, at 163 (“[T]here
was precious little evidence that the directors paid much attention as the tide turned at each of these
companies. . . . Nor do any of the directors seem to have asked any serious questions about Enron’s
increasingly grandiose plans to create markets in everything under the sun.”).
This process-oriented approach prevents courts and shareholders from
second-guessing the merits of directors’ decisions with the benefit of
hindsight and maintains directors’ authority to make decisions for the
corporation so long as they do so with care. Yet this approach also allows
shareholders and courts to review the process that the directors used to
make decisions. A process-oriented approach would reach the potential
duty-of-care breaches in the recent scandals, which revealed that “many
boards of directors are captured by the firm’s senior management and
simply rubberstamp management decisions.”  Enron’s board of directors256
provides a prime example of directors failing to adequately inform
themselves and to monitor management.
[S]ome directors have admitted to signing off on company
reports with limited or no knowledge of their contents, while
others have admitted to approving transactions even when
they did not fully understand them. Still other directors made
decisions regarding highly complex transactions after only
brief consideration of the issues critical to those transactions.
These actions appear contrary to the directors’ duty to remain
informed and suggest that instead of providing a vigorous
check on managerial conduct, the directors merely rubber-
stamped management’s decisions. Then too, despite their
awareness of potential risk, directors only made cursory
inquiries into transactions involving conflicts of interest or
high-risk hedge activity. Again, such conduct seems
inconsistent with the directors’ fiduciary obligation to ask
probing questions before approving company transactions.257
Thus, Enron demonstrates that courts can protect shareholder interests
without reviewing the substance of directors’ decisions.
If directors use the process-oriented approach in making decisions on
behalf of the corporation, they can assure themselves that potential
plaintiffs will file few lawsuits alleging violations of the duty of care. The
minutes of the board of directors can contain sufficient evidence that the
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258. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); see also Richard M. Cieri &
Michael J. Riela, Protecting Directors and Officers of Corporations That Are Insolvent or in the
Zone or Vicinity of Insolvency: Important Considerations, Practical Solutions, 2 DEPAUL BUS. &
COM.L.J. 295, 317 (2004) (“The Walt Disney case illustrates the importance of keeping adequately
detailed minutes of committee and board meetings . . . . [B]ecause the minutes of the committee
and board meetings were so sparse the court drew an inference that the directors did not exercise
their duty of care.”).
259. Cf. Donald J. Wolfe et al., Notable Delaware Corporate Decisions 2005: Delaware-
Centric Musings on Disney, Toys “R” Us, TCI, Unisuper, and Examen, in WHAT ALL BUSINESS
LAWYERS AND LITIGATORS MUST KNOW ABOUT DELAWARE LAW DEVELOPMENTS 2006, at 441,
450 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 8423, 2006), WL 1543 PLI/Corp 441
(noting that formal meetings matter because they provide a sufficient “record to establish that
proper deliberation and care with respect to a matter occurred”).
260. Cf. id. at 451 (“[B]oard meeting minutes should be detailed enough that it is later possible
for the board to establish, or a neutral fact finder to determine, the approximate length of time spent
considering a matter of importance and the general nature of the matters discussed.”).
261. See Atkins, supra note 219, at 907 (“Having adequate meetings, well-documented
minutes showing careful deliberations, and thorough briefings demonstrate a decision ‘process’
discharging their duty of care, which helps immunize the board from future lawsuits.”).
262. See FED. R. EVID. 902(11)(C) (stating that a party must provide written notice of an
intention to offer a business record into evidence and “must make the record and declaration
available for inspection sufficiently in advance of their offer into evidence to provide an adverse
party with a fair opportunity to challenge them”); DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 902(11)(C) (same); see also
Lano v. Rochester Germicide Co., 113 N.W.2d 460, 464 (Minn. 1962) (stating that corporate
minutes are only prima facie records of the proceedings and oral testimony is admissible to show
the minutes are incomplete), overruled on other grounds by Melin v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 266
N.W.2d 183 (Minn. 1978); Plumbers & Steamfitters, Local Union 530 Annuity Fund v. Shaffer,
directors gathered all information reasonably available to them and
reasonably deliberated before making a decision.  Thus, the minutes258
should reflect how the directors informed themselves—by documenting
whether the directors received information before the meeting, whether
officers or outside experts made presentations to the board, and whether
any questions were raised.  The directors can then attach to the minutes259
the distributed documents and presentations, and can also document the
time spent discussing each issue.  By placing these details in the meeting260
minutes, the directors will have the evidence necessary to defeat any
allegation that they breached their duty of care, and more importantly, they
will have actually taken due care in making their decisions.  In addition,261
such evidence should allow the directors to prevail on an early motion to
dismiss.
A potential criticism of such detailed minutes is that corporations may
jump through the necessary procedural hoops but would avoid any
substantive action required by their fiduciary duties. Notwithstanding this
criticism, courts cannot define, let alone evaluate, the substance of
directors’ decisions without interfering with directors’ statutory authority
to manage the corporation. Further, plaintiffs have recourse in instances
where corporations falsely document their procedures.  262
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457 F. Supp. 954, 956 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (noting that, because minutes are only prima facie evidence
of a meeting, parol evidence is admissible to prove errors in the minutes). 
263. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873.
264. Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 128 (“No matter how gingerly courts apply the standard of
liability, trying to measure the ‘quantity’ of negligence is a task best left untried.”).
265. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2008).
266. See Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 264 (Del. 2002).
267. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., supra note 182, § 303A.02(b) cmt. (defining immediate family for
the purpose of testing director independence).
268. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.
Upon review in litigation, courts can capably assess the procedures that
directors followed in making a decision by examining whether the
directors gathered all information reasonably available to them. The
standard of liability thus would state that directors have a duty to inform
themselves of all reasonably available information before making a
decision, and the court would impose liability when directors violated that
standard. Although Delaware courts have sometimes required plaintiffs to
prove the directors’ violation of due care amounted to gross negligence,263
a properly defined standard of liability negates the need for showing gross
negligence.  264
2.  The Duty of Loyalty
The standard of liability for the duty of loyalty should state that
directors must be disinterested and independent to make a decision in the
best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. Thus, if directors are
self-interested in a transaction, courts may presume that those directors
acted in their own interest and not in the best interests of the corporation
when voting on the transaction. To avoid litigation, the interested directors
must (1) disclose fully such interest to the other directors and (2) refrain
from voting on the transaction.  Proving that a director has a direct265
financial interest in a transaction poses no significant problems in
litigation. Further, through appropriate board minutes, directors can
demonstrate that they disclosed any self-interest and refrained from voting
on the transaction.
Beyond self-interest, however, the water becomes murky. Courts have
assumed that a director with a close familial interest in a transaction
cannot act independently.  Such family relationships have been confined266
primarily to immediate family—spouse, parents, siblings, and children.267
In a litigation context, plaintiffs can easily identify and prove such
relationships. However, the recent corporate scandals demonstrate that
various types of friendships may affect a director’s independence.268
Unfortunately, friendship poses a problem as a basis for challenging the
independence of directors. Both business and social relationships may be
defined as friendships, and whether such relationships provide sufficient
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269. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006); see also Sale, supra note 189, at 463.
270. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 369; Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.)
(Disney VI), 906 A.2d 27, 52–53 (Del. 2006).
271. Elizabeth Nowicki, Not in Good Faith Means Not in Good Faith, CONGLOMERATE BLOG:
BUS. L. ECON. & SOC’Y, Jan. 26, 2006, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2006/01/ not_in_good_
fai.html.
“[B]ad faith” and “not in good faith” mean two different things. By obligating a
plaintiff to prove that a director acted in bad faith, the court is obligating the
plaintiff to identify facts much worse than those that would establish the lack of
good faith. That is to say, “bad faith” conduct is roughly conduct that is
affirmatively against the interests of the corporation (such as fraudulent conduct).
Good faith conduct is conduct that is in the best interest of and taken for the
purpose of benefiting the corporation. So “not in good faith” conduct is conduct
that is not taken for the purpose of benefiting the corporation—conduct that is not
deliberately chosen as being in the best interest of the corporation. An act “not in
good faith” does not have to be a nasty, fraudulent, selfish, etc. act. The phrase
“not in good faith” does include these “bad faith” acts, but the phrase also
includes acts that are not venal or otherwise ill-motivated, such as an abdication
of duties due to time pressure.
Id.
reason to conclude that a director did not act independently presents a
question of fact. Plaintiffs may identify directors as friends even when
those directors do not consider themselves friends or anything more than
colleagues. Moreover, a plaintiff will have difficulty proving that a
friendship caused a director not to act independently because a director’s
subjective relationship presents an inherently factual issue. In addition,
inquiring into the subjective relationship between directors presents a
significant risk that plaintiffs and courts will evaluate the alleged
friendship based on the merits of the transaction. For these reasons,
independence should be limited to close familial relationships.
3.  The Duty of Good Faith
Delaware has not clearly signaled whether a breach of a duty of good
faith may ever serve as a basis for overcoming the business judgment rule
presumption. To the extent that the duty of good faith already exists within
the duty of loyalty,  a separate duty of good faith is not necessary.269
Similarly, to the extent that a court could hold that the same conduct
violated both the duty of good faith and either the duty of loyalty or care,
then a duty of good faith is unnecessary. In Disney and Stone v. Ritter,
however, the Delaware courts signaled that good faith may occupy a
sphere separate from care and loyalty by defining instances constituting
bad faith.  Nonetheless, the courts did not clearly indicate whether “not270
in good faith” and “bad faith” are interchangeable.271
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272. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted “only if plaintiffs cannot
prevail as a matter of law given all the reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the
complaint.” Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 287 (Del. 2003).
273. See, e.g., Ulrich Boettger, Efficiency Versus Party Empowerment—Against a Good-Faith
Requirement in Mandatory Mediations, 23 REV. LITIG. 1 (2004) (arguing against imposing a good-
faith requirement in mediations); Teri J. Dobbins, Losing Faith: Extracting the Implied Covenant
of Good Faith from (Some) Contracts, 84 OR. L. REV. 227 (2005) (arguing that the covenant of
good faith should not be implied in every contract); Rebecca Ellen Bruck, Comment, Lessons in
Eliminating Statutory Vagueness: Rule 11 of the FRCP as a Model for Removing the “Good Faith”
Fulcrum from Section 707(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 19 BANKR. DEV. J. 399 (2003) (advocating
for the elimination of the good-faith requirement in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings).
274. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
But incorporating any duty of good faith into the business judgment
rule engulfs the courts in an endless web. The primary problem with
allowing a duty of good faith to overcome the business judgment rule
presumption is that such allegations are inherently fact based and thus
rarely, if ever, could be resolved on pretrial motions. Any plaintiff’s
attorney could craft a complaint stating a claim for breach of the duty of
good faith sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.  Such an attorney272
could also likely gather the facts necessary to raise a factual dispute that
could survive summary judgment. Thus, the case would get to trial on the
issue of the directors’ good faith. If a plaintiff alleging a breach of the duty
of good faith can get to trial, then the litigation costs to the corporation and
the nonplaintiff-shareholders increase, as does the amount of any potential
settlement. Good faith thus may become the stalking horse of the
plaintiffs’ bar—the way to get a case to discovery and to trial. 
The duty of good faith also provides a potential “catch all” for courts,
particularly when a court cannot find a clear violation of the traditional
duties of care or loyalty. Although good faith is a common concept in the
law, few satisfying definitions exist. Courts and commentators have
consistently struggled not only to define good faith in other contexts but
also to define breaches of good faith. In fact, commentators have proposed
abolishing good-faith standards in other areas of the law.  Moreover,273
courts have difficulty applying the concept of good faith with any
consistency. For all these reasons, a duty of good faith should never serve
as an independent basis for rebutting the presumption of the business
judgment rule.
B.  Implementing Procedural Changes
The unpredictability of shareholder derivative litigation could also be
improved through several procedural changes. Enacting a heightened
pleading standard, such as the one that exists for fraud claims, would
provide a procedural change to deter frivolous and meritless derivative
actions.  Shareholder derivative litigation already has a heightened274
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275. See supra Part II.A.
276. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2008); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 16.02
(2007).
277. A Court may restrict a plaintiff’s initial discovery when the court has reservations about
the basis for the plaintiff’s claims. See In re BHC Commc’ns, Inc. S’holder Litig., 789 A.2d 1, 14
(Del. Ch. 2001) (limiting topics and types of discovery).
pleading standard regarding the demand requirement, which permits
motions to dismiss early in litigation.  Yet the hurdle imposed on275
shareholders by this demand requirement is low enough for many cases to
survive it. The heightened pleading standard could be expanded to require
shareholders to plead facts that overcome the business judgment rule
presumption for the challenged board decision. In other words,
shareholders would have to plead with specificity the factual allegations
establishing a breach of one or more of the fiduciary duties, or establishing
that the business judgment rule otherwise does not apply because of fraud,
illegality, or waste. By requiring a heightened pleading standard,
defendants could file motions to dismiss on the business judgment rule
before discovery. 
Under the current burden-shifting scheme, the business judgment rule
establishes a hurdle that shareholders must overcome. Thus, the
heightened pleading standard does not impose a new burden on
shareholder derivative litigation. This standard would require, however,
that shareholders and their attorneys do their homework before filing such
suits. Shareholders can gather facts showing a breach of fiduciary duty by
obtaining copies of the minutes of board of directors’ meetings.  The276
minutes would reveal facts for a prima facie case of a duty-of-care breach.
An investigation could also reveal any violations of the duty of loyalty,
such as relationships among directors suggesting a lack of independence
or a director being interested in the challenged transaction. The courts
should not serve as the means by which shareholders can harass directors
or conduct a fishing expedition.277
For many years, both the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 and the
Delaware Chancery Court Rule 23.1 have required the plaintiff in a
derivative complaint to allege that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the
time of the challenged transaction and to state the details of the demand
requirement. The Delaware Chancery Court recently amended Rule 23.1
to deter frivolous derivative litigation by also requiring the plaintiff to file
an affidavit stating that the person has not received, been
promised or offered and will not accept any form of
compensation, directly or indirectly, for prosecuting or
serving as a representative party in the derivative action in
which the person or entity is a named party except (i) such
fees, costs or other payments as the Court expressly approves
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278. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(b) (effective Jan. 1, 2007).
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to be paid to or on behalf of such person, or (ii)
reimbursement, paid by such person’s attorneys, of actual and
reasonable out-of-pocket expenditures incurred directly in
connection with the prosecution of the action.278
This amendment, however, does not go far enough. The required affidavit
may deter collusion between shareholder-plaintiffs and plaintiffs’
attorneys, but the affidavit does nothing to ensure that shareholder-
plaintiffs adequately represent all shareholders.
To ensure that plaintiffs adequately represent the corporation and all
shareholders, the Delaware Legislature could further amend Delaware
Chancery Court Rule 23.1 to require that shareholders representing a
specified percentage of ownership join together as plaintiffs to bring a
derivative action. The specified percentage of ownership could be
measured in dollars or percentage terms. For instance, the amendment
could require that the plaintiffs collectively own $5,000 or 5% of a
corporation’s outstanding stock. Increasing the financial stake of the
plaintiffs in the litigation will increase the likelihood that those plaintiffs
act in the best interests of the corporation and all its shareholders because
the plaintiffs stand to lose more in unsuccessful litigation. The required
percentage must not be set so high as to prevent all such actions but must
be set high enough to ensure that the challenged director conduct concerns
all shareholders. 
In conjunction with this percentage requirement, or as an alternative,
Delaware could enact a statute requiring plaintiffs to post security for
expenses (i.e., a bond) as a prerequisite to filing a shareholder derivative
action unless they collectively meet the prescribed percentage of
ownership. This requirement would help ensure that plaintiffs adequately
represent all shareholders by demanding a significant monetary investment
in the litigation. Several states have adopted similar statutes,  which279
typically require plaintiffs filing derivative actions to post a bond in an
amount sufficient to cover the defendants’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and
expenses.280
Other procedural changes could assess the business judgment rule early
in litigation to weed out meritless lawsuits before discovery. Plaintiffs’
attorneys may argue that any ruling on the business judgment rule should
come at the close of discovery because otherwise no shareholder could
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gather evidence to overcome the defense. In allowing discovery, however,
the corporation and the directors must spend significant amounts of time
and resources on the litigation. If the court can make a preliminary
decision on the likelihood of the plaintiffs prevailing on the
merits—rebutting the business judgment rule—then that decision would
save time and resources to the benefit of all.
The obvious question is how such a decision could be made. A motion
to dismiss is one possibility, but courts can manipulate these motions and
frustrate the purposes of the business judgment rule. Further, a decision
denying a motion to dismiss is generally not immediately appealable.  An281
alternative would be to treat the business judgment rule similar to the
absolute-immunity and qualified-immunity defenses.  A decision on282
immunity occurs early in the litigation because a later decision destroys
the benefit of immunity.  An order denying immunity is also immediately283
appealable  because the benefit of immunity is destroyed if the defendant284
must litigate to a final judgment before appealing the immunity issue.
Similarly, the rationale and purpose of the business judgment rule suggests
that courts should decide the applicability of the defense early in litigation
to provide proper deference to directors’ statutory authority to manage the
corporation and to protect the non-plaintiff shareholders. Also, the
possibility of an immediate appeal will help ensure that trial courts
properly analyze the relevant standards of liability and that they do not
frustrate the purposes of the business judgment rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
In response to recent corporate scandals, the Delaware courts
unnecessarily injected doctrinal confusion and unpredictability into
shareholder derivative litigation. The courts are allowing more cases to
survive pretrial motions asserting the business judgment rule defense
without stating any new standards. Instead, the courts are exploiting the
disparity they previously created between the standards of conduct for
directors’ fiduciary duties and the standards of liability applied for
assessing alleged breaches of those duties. As a result, Delaware law
potentially creates significant negative consequences for shareholders,
corporations, directors, investors, and other litigants.
The Delaware Legislature could remove this doctrinal confusion and
unpredictability by enacting a statute that codifies the business judgment
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rule and defines clear standards of liability for the rule’s underlying
fiduciary duties. The courts would continue to play a key role in regulating
the conduct of corporate directors by applying those standards to the cases
that the court is called upon to decide, but the courts would need to
exercise caution to retain clear standards of legal liability by which
directors may govern their behavior and shareholders may evaluate
potential derivative cases. In addition, procedural changes could be
implemented to deter frivolous derivative cases and to weed out meritless
cases early in litigation. With these changes, shareholder derivative
litigation can continue to play its proper role in corporate governance.
